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Modelling Subrogation as an 
“Equitable Remedy”
Stephen Watterson*
Following the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Banque Financière de la 
Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd, the English courts have come to say that subrogation to 
extinguished rights is an “equitable remedy” designed to reverse “unjust enrichment”. 
This creative re-rationalisation requires a fresh look at the nature and operation of this 
phenomenon, and in particular, at the key components of the “new” orthodoxy — that such 
subrogation is a “remedy”, which is “equitable” in origin, and is “restitutionary” in aim 
and effect. A clear understanding of these components is not of merely academic interest. 
It is vital for a proper understanding of the nature and timing of the entitlements 
that are afforded to subrogation claimants, and of a court’s role in their recognition 
and effectuation. On closer examination, the cases reveal an unacknowledged and 
unresolved tension between two different conceptions of the remedy’s operation: (i) a 
“strong institutional model”; and (ii) a weaker institutional model, which is labelled 
the “liability model”. Adopting either model, subrogation is not a drastically “remedial” 
phenomenon which yields entitlements for claimants only by virtue of some judicial 
order. Subrogation-justifying facts will immediately trigger some form of entitlement 
for a subrogation claimant, which arises prior to, and independently of, any subsequent 
court order. Nevertheless, the nature and quality of this pre-court entitlement, and 
the court’s role in its recognition and effectuation, will differ depending on the model 
preferred. On balance, the liability model is the more defensible in principle. It should 
ultimately prevail.
* University Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge, and John Collier 
Fellow in Law, Trinity Hall, Cambridge. 
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1.  Declaratory orders
2.  Consequential enforcement orders
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1.  The court’s general approach to the remedy
2.  Identifying subrogation-justifying facts
3.  Identifying the nature and extent of C’s subrogation 
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C.  Determining the Wider Implications of Any Subrogation 
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VI. Conclusion
I. Introduction
There is a substantial body of English authorities, encountered in various contexts, which exhibit the following general pattern: (i) 
C claimant has been responsible for discharging a liability owed by D 
debtor to X creditor; and (ii) subject to further conditions, C is said to 
be subrogated to X’s rights against D, including any security that X held 
for D’s debt. Often, C is a disappointed lender, who loaned money to 
finance a property purchase or to re-finance existing liabilities, and did 
not obtain the security for its advance that it bargained for. Alternatively, 
C is an unwitting victim of a misappropriation of funds, which are 
used without his authority to discharge another’s liabilities. In yet other 
cases, C is a surety, or someone equivalently placed, who has paid the 
guaranteed debt and thereby discharged liabilities of the principal debtor 
and co-sureties.
At first sight, references to subrogation in this context can look 
puzzling. The most familiar species of subrogation, as encountered in 
the field of indemnity insurance, undoubtedly works differently: an 
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indemnity insurer, having indemnified its insured, is ordinarily entitled to 
bring proceedings, in the insured’s name, to enforce the insured’s subsisting 
rights against third parties. In the different cases that are presently in view, 
how can C be subrogated to the rights of X, the paid-off creditor, when, 
ex hypothesi, X’s rights were extinguished? In English law, the modern 
answer to this puzzle has involved recognising that in this context, the 
language of subrogation is a “metaphor” rather than a “literal truth”.1 
Although past cases sometimes spoke of X’s rights being “kept alive” 
in equity for C’s benefit,2 C does not actually acquire X’s rights, or the 
benefit of X’s rights, by transfer or otherwise. X’s rights are extinguished, 
and C acquires rights only to the extent that that has occurred.3 In truth, 
what appears to be happening in these cases is that equity is affording 
new rights to C, which prima facie replicate X’s extinguished rights.4 
Why? Since the House of Lords’ landmark decision in Banque Financière 
de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd 5 (“Banque Financière”), the answer which 
the English courts have given is that equity affords such rights to C where 
that is appropriate to reverse the unjust enrichment that would otherwise 
accrue from the discharge of X’s rights, to D and others, at C’s expense. 
In short, this form of subrogation is said to be an “equitable remedy” 
directed at a very specific goal: it is a “restitutionary remedy” for “unjust 
1. See especially Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd, [1999] 1 
AC 221 (HL) at 236-37, per Lord Hoffmann [Banque Financière].
2. See e.g. Chetwynd v Allen, [1899] 1 Ch 353 (Eng) at 357 [Chetwynd]; 
Butler v Rice, [1910] 2 Ch 277 (Eng) at 282 [Butler]; Ghana Commercial 
Bank v Chandiram, [1960] AC 732 (PC (Ghana)) at 745 [Chandiram]; 
Western Trust & Savings Ltd v Rock, [1993] NPC 89 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) 
[Western Trust].
3. See especially Boscawen v Bajwa, [1996] 1 WLR 328 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at 
340, per Millett LJ [Boscawen]; Banque Financière, supra note 1 at 236. 
4. See especially Charles Mitchell & Stephen Watterson, Subrogation: Law 
and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) ch 8 [Mitchell & 
Watterson, Subrogation]; for explicit recent acceptance, see Day v Tiuta 
International Ltd, [2014] EWCA Civ 1246 at para 43 [Tiuta].
5. Banque Financière, supra note 1.
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enrichment”.6
The creative re-rationalisation of past decisions has not received 
unanimous approval. In particular, whilst several other common law 
jurisdictions appear receptive to the Banque Financière approach, 
Australian courts have rejected it.7 There is no need to enter into that 
controversy. This article’s ambition is different: to undertake a deeper, 
conceptual inquiry into the nature and operation of the subrogation 
remedy, as presently conceived by the English courts. This involves 
unpacking three key components of the post-Banque Financière 
orthodoxy: i.e. that subrogation is a “remedy”, which is “equitable” in 
origin, and is “restitutionary” in aim and effect.
A clear understanding of these components is not of merely academic 
interest. It is essential for a proper understanding of the nature and timing 
of the entitlements afforded to subrogation claimants, and of the court’s 
role in their recognition and effectuation. To anticipate this article’s major 
conclusions, it will be argued that the cases that concern the restitutionary 
remedy of “subrogation to extinguished rights”8 — hereafter, “Banque 
Financière subrogation” — exhibit an unacknowledged and unresolved 
tension between two different conceptions of the remedy’s operation: (i) a 
“strong institutional model”; and (ii) a weaker institutional model, which 
will be labelled the “liability model”. Adopting either model, subrogation 
is not a drastically “remedial” phenomenon that yields entitlements for 
a claimant only by virtue of some judicial order. Subrogation-justifying 
6. See especially, ibid, at 231-32, 234-37, per Lord Hoffman. For very recent 
affirmation of this understanding, see the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd, [2015] UKSC 66 [Menelaou SC] 
(where only Lord Carnwath expressed scepticism).
7. See the High Court of Australia’s vehement rejection of the English 
approach, obiter, in Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd, [2009] HCA 44 
[Bofinger], echoing scepticism previously expressed in, inter alia, Highland 
v Exception Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq), [2006] NSWCA 318 (Austl) and 
Challenger Managed Investments Ltd v Direct Money Corp, [2003] NSWSC 
1072 (Austl) [Challenger].
8. For the distinction between subrogation to “subsisting” rights and 
subrogation to “extinguished” rights, see Mitchell & Watterson, 
Subrogation, supra note 4, ch 1.
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facts do immediately trigger some form of entitlement for a subrogation 
claimant, which arises prior to, and independently of, any subsequent 
court order. Nevertheless, the nature and quality of this pre-court 
entitlement, and the court’s role in its recognition and effectuation, will 
differ, depending on the model preferred. On balance, the liability model 
is the more defensible in principle. It should ultimately prevail.
II. A “Restitutionary” Remedy
In what sense is subrogation a “restitutionary” remedy? On some visions 
of the law of unjust enrichment, it looks like a rather unusual response. 
The standard restitutionary remedy, where a cause of action in unjust 
enrichment is established, is an award of monetary restitution: the law 
imposes a personal liability on D, measured by the value in money of 
the unjust enrichment that D received at C’s expense.9 The Banque 
Financière subrogation remedy, afforded where C discharges liabilities 
that D owes to X, is not of this nature. C will certainly seek this remedy 
in order ultimately to procure some monetary recovery, directly from 
D or indirectly by recourse to D’s assets. Nevertheless, C’s claim to 
relief by way of subrogation is not immediately a claim to an award of 
monetary restitution.10 C will be asserting that he should be afforded 
rights equivalent to those previously enjoyed by X. That ordinarily means 
a security interest, which replicates X’s, and secures the amount of the 
debt, owed by D to X, which C was responsible for discharging.
9. See e.g. Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell & Stephen Watterson, eds, Goff 
& Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011) ch 36 [Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones].
10. This has led some to suggest that subrogation cannot be a response 
to unjust enrichment, on the basis that a cause of action in unjust 
enrichment can only trigger an award of monetary restitution against the 
discharged debtor, and cannot account for the acquisition of a security 
interest by subrogation: see especially the doubts expressed about the 
Banque Financière unjust enrichment rationalisation in Challenger, supra 
note 7 at para 97.
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A. “Factual Enrichment” and “Legal Enrichment”
In identifying subrogation’s role as a restitutionary remedy, one might 
usefully begin with a distinction recently highlighted by Andrew Lodder,11 
between two different kinds of enrichment: “factual” and “legal”.12 What 
Lodder labels “factual” enrichment consists of the receipt of value by a 
defendant — in the form of money, or some non-money benefit, such 
as services, susceptible to valuation in money. “Factual” enrichments 
are the familiar subject-matter of awards of monetary restitution.13 
By contrast, a “legal” enrichment consists of either the acquisition of 
rights or the release of duties/liabilities.14 These might also be treated as 
“factual” enrichments, and reversed via an award of monetary restitution. 
However, on Lodder’s account, viewing them as legal enrichments, 
the law may respond differently: reversing the enrichment “in law” via 
a specific restitutionary mechanism. For example, following Lodder’s 
account, one can contemplate the law achieving specific restitution, 
where D is enriched by the acquisition of rights, via C’s entitlement to 
rescind a defective transfer, or the imposition of a trust in C’s favour.15 
B. The Role for the Subrogation “Remedy”
It remains hotly contested within English law whether, and on what 
basis, the courts might award something other than the “standard” 
remedy of monetary restitution in circumstances of unjust enrichment. 
11. Andrew Lodder, Enrichment in the Law of Unjust Enrichment and 
Restitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012).
12. Ibid ch 3. Cf. the distinction previously drawn by Robert Chambers, on 
which Lodder builds, between enrichment by the receipt of “value” and 
enrichment by the receipt of “rights”: see Robert Chambers, “Two Kinds 
of Enrichment” in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell & James Penner, 
eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) ch 9.
13. See Lodder, supra note 11 (“[w]henever the claimant seeks restitution of a 
factual enrichment, the response is always the same: a right to be paid the 
value of the enrichment received at the claimant’s expense” at 64).
14. Ibid at 55-67 and ch 5.
15. Cf. ibid at 64-66.
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Nevertheless, in light of recent scholarship, it looks plausible to suggest 
that Banque Financière subrogation — the remedy of subrogation to 
another’s extinguished rights — is a restitutionary remedy, addressed to 
a very particular sub-set of legal enrichments, which reverses such legal 
enrichments by a very particular form of specific restitutionary response.16 
Three key points need brief elaboration.
1. Enrichment via the release of rights, at a third party’s 
expense
First, properly understood, Banque Financière subrogation is contextually 
confined to circumstances that involve an enrichment in the form of 
a release of another’s rights, achieved at a third party’s expense. What 
ordinarily triggers subrogation is the discharge of a liability which D 
owed X, by a payment for which C, a third party, is relevantly responsible. 
This last feature is crucial. It is C’s status as a third party to the original 
creditor-debtor relation between X and D that makes it possible to talk 
of C acquiring equivalents of X’s extinguished rights by a process of 
“subrogation”. A similar enrichment could arise in a bipartite setting — 
e.g. where labouring under a mistake, C, a creditor, releases his security 
for D’s liabilities.17 In such circumstances, the law might also afford C a 
form of specific relief, which restores his released rights.18 However, this 
would not be subrogation: C would not step into another’s shoes, actually 
or metaphorically. He would reacquire his own previously-released rights.
16. Cf. ibid ch 5. There are difficulties with Lodder’s brief account of how 
subrogation works; however, the core of his analysis, that subrogation 
offers a form of specific restitution, addressed to the release of a duty/
liability, is plausible.
17. Cf. NRAM v Evans, [2015] EWHC 1543 (Ch); Garwood v Bank of 
Scotland, [2013] EWHC 415 (Ch); Fender v National Westminster Bank, 
[2008] EWHC 2242 (Ch); Dixon v Barton, [2011] NSWSC 1525 
(Austl).
18. Ibid. This is the effect of the relief ultimately afforded, in different ways, 
in the cases listed.
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2. A form of specific restitutionary mechanism, involving 
newly-created rights that replicate the old
Secondly, Banque Financière subrogation can be regarded as a form of 
specific restitutionary mechanism. When C brings about the release of 
D’s liabilities to X, in circumstances involving unjust enrichment, the law 
can obviously afford C a monetary remedy, measured by the value of the 
discharged liabilities: the value in money of the unjust enrichment that 
accrues to D, at C’s expense, from their release. That would be an award 
of monetary restitution, addressed to D’s “factual” enrichment. However, 
in the same circumstances, equity can also afford C a different remedy, 
in the form of a Banque Financière subrogation. This would be a specific 
restitutionary mechanism, addressed to the release of D’s liabilities, 
conceived as a “legal” enrichment. On this analysis, equity achieves the 
in specie reversal of the unjust enrichment that would otherwise accrue 
from the release, to D and others, by effectively recreating the released 
liabilities in favour of C, a new party: C is afforded new rights, against D 
and others, which prima facie replicate those previously enjoyed by X.19
This explanation seems the most faithful to what the recent cases say 
about the basis of the remedy and its nature. Nevertheless, it is important 
to acknowledge that it depends on some contestable assumptions about 
the nature of “restitutionary” remedies afforded within the law of 
unjust enrichment.20 In a bipartite setting,21 if the law was to restore 
C’s previously-released rights against D, it would be effecting “specific 
restitution” in the strongest/fullest sense: the law would restore to C 
rights that he formerly held against D. In contrast, the subrogation cases 
necessitate the adoption of a broader, and in one sense weaker/diluted 
vision of what would be involved in specific restitution, according to 
19. Cf. Lord Carnwath’s sceptical statements in Menelaou SC, supra note 6 at 
para 117 (which seems to overlook this explanation).
20. Cf. an alternative, “reductionist” model of subrogation’s role as a 
“restitutionary remedy” which is developed and critically examined 
in Stephen Watterson, “Subrogation”, in Graham Virgo and Sarah 
Worthington, eds, Commercial Remedies: Resolving Controversies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2016).
21. See the text, supra notes 17-18. 
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which the primary remedial objective would be the in specie reversal of 
D’s unjust enrichment. Ex hypothesi, the subrogation “remedy” involves 
the creation of equivalents of D’s released liabilities to X in favour of 
a new party, C. This reverses D’s enrichment in specie, but only via a 
“restitutionary” mechanism that affords C rights of a nature that he did 
not previously have.22  
3. In particularised circumstances of unjust enrichment
Thirdly, when the House of Lords held in Banque Financière that 
subrogation was a remedy for unjust enrichment, they did not mean 
that unjust enrichment merely provided a meta-principle that loosely 
connected the subrogation cases, at a high level, to the wider body of 
authorities conventionally gathered in treatises on the law of restitution/
unjust enrichment. Subrogation was a remedy for unjust enrichment in 
the fullest sense: in the future, the remedy’s availability was to be tested 
by reference to the components of the unjust enrichment framework that 
has been used to analyse and determine the availability of a cause of action 
in unjust enrichment sufficient to support standard awards of monetary 
22. This is an available understanding of “specific restitution”, which may 
require a corresponding commitment to a particular position in a more 
general controversy within the law of unjust enrichment concerning 
the essential character of “restitutionary remedies”. In broad terms, the 
debate concerns whether the law’s focus is (i) on the reversal of D’s unjust 
enrichment; or is (ii) a more two-sided process, where the existence 
and extent of any restitutionary remedy is limited by reference to C’s 
equivalent/corresponding “loss”. Unjust enrichment scholars divide. 
Lodder explicitly assumes the former, broader conception of “restitution”: 
see Lodder, supra note 11 at 7-8. Cf. the discussion in Peter Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment, 2d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 78-86 [Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment]; Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3d (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 64-69; Graham Virgo, The Principles of 
the Law of Restitution, 3d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 116-
18; Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, supra note 9 at 6.63-
6.74; Michael Rush, The Defence of Passing On (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2006) Part II. 
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restitution.23 Accordingly, to establish his subrogation entitlement, C 
would need to identify some legally recognised ground for restitution (e.g. 
a restitution-grounding mistake or failure of basis);24 and he might find 
his claim defeated/diminished by any defence/bar that could be raised 
to any unjust enrichment claim (e.g. illegality/public policy, change of 
position, bona fide purchase, contractual exclusion/limitation, expiry of 
a limitation period).25 Some early post-Banque Financière cases showed 
unease about the implications of this new approach.26 Nevertheless, a 
gathering tide of English cases has followed their Lordships’ lead, and 
explicitly justified the availability of the subrogation remedy, on particular 
facts, using the unjust enrichment framework.27
C. Outstanding Questions
Even if it is accepted that Banque Financière subrogation functions as 
a restitutionary remedy as just outlined, important questions remain 
unanswered regarding its operation and effects. In particular, what is 
the court’s role in these cases? Does the availability of the subrogation 
remedy depend upon a court order, which a judge might grant or refuse 
as appropriate? Or does a subrogation claimant have some form of pre-
court entitlement, generated as the facts happen? If the latter, what 
exactly is the nature of this entitlement? And if its existence does not 
strictly depend upon a judicial order, what exactly is the court’s role, 
when subsequently asked to determine the parties’ legal positions? It is to 
these questions that our attention must now turn.
23. See especially Banque Financière, supra note 1, per Lord Hoffmann and 
Lord Steyn; and see now Menelaou SC, supra note 6. Cf. the very different 
vision of the law in Australia presented in Bofinger, supra note 7. 
24. See Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 ch 6 (the ground 
identified there as “ignorance” is now better labelled as “lack of consent” 
or “want of authority”: Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, 
supra note 9 ch 8).
25. See Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 ch 7.
26. See e.g. Halifax v Omar, [2002] EWCA Civ 121 [Omar].
27. See most recently, Menelaou SC, supra note 6; and see further the cases 
cited infra notes 113 and 143.
620 
 
Watterson, Modelling Subrogation as an “Equitable Remedy”
III. An Entitlement Arising Out of Court
On examination, there is overwhelming evidence that Banque Financière 
subrogation yields some form of entitlement for C, the subrogation 
claimant, as the legally significant facts occur, and independently of any 
court order. To that extent, Banque Financière subrogation represents an 
“institutional” response, which affects the parties’ legal positions “on the 
ground”, “as the facts happen”. It is not a radically “remedial” response, 
which brings legal consequences only from the time of any subsequent 
court order. This is evident from the cases in at least the following eight 
ways.
A. Party Pleadings, Judicial Reasoning, and Court 
Orders
First, the language of parties’ pleadings, judicial reasoning, and court 
orders points strongly to C having some form of pre-court entitlement. 
Claimants in their pleadings and arguments, and judges when addressing 
them, have often spoken of the claimant “being” subrogated, or having 
“become entitled” to be subrogated from some material date in the past; 
or more often in older cases, of the former creditor’s rights “being kept 
alive” or “having been kept alive” for the claimant’s benefit. Consistently 
with this, when claimants ask a court to adjudicate as to their subrogation 
rights, the primary remedy sought is a declaration that they are or 
have become entitled to a security interest by subrogation28 — terms 
suggestive of a confirmatory, rather than purely constitutive, order. The 
courts routinely oblige, granting declarations which have often declared, 
28. See e.g. Butler, supra note 2 at 278; Congresbury Motors Ltd v Anglo-
Belge Finance Co Ltd, [1971] Ch 81 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at 83 [Congresbury 
CA]; Coptic Ltd v Bailey, [1972] Ch 446 (Eng) at 448; Burston Finance 
Ltd v Speirway Ltd, [1974] 1 WLR 1648 (Ch (Eng)) at 1650 [Burston 
Finance]; Boodle Hatfield & Co v British Films Ltd, (1986) 2 BCC 99221 
(Ch (Eng)) [Boodle Hatfield]; Castle Phillips Finance Co Ltd v Piddington, 
(1995) 70 P&CR 592 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at 598 [Piddington]; Boscawen, 
supra note 3 at 329-30; Primlake Ltd v Matthews Associates, [2009] 
EWHC 2774 (Ch) at para 17 [Primlake]; Lehman Commercial Mortgage 
Conduit Ltd v Gatedale Ltd, [2012] EWHC 848 (Ch) at para 2 [Lehman].
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in explicit terms, that C’s rights exist as at a particular, material date in 
the past.29 
Although the courts have rarely analysed the nature of C’s position 
before he comes before them, the few dicta that do also point strongly 
to some form of pre-court entitlement. In particular, in the influential 
pre-Banque Financière decision in Boscawen v Bajwa30 (“Boscawen”), Lord 
Justice Millett spoke of a pre-existing subrogation “right” or “equity”, 
which the court’s order would “satisfy” — apparently meaning by this 
to deny that C’s subrogation entitlement depends on any judicial order, 
or indeed on any election by C, and to affirm that C’s subrogation 
“right” or “equity” was an entitlement that came into being, out of 
court, as the triggering facts occurred.31 Reinforcing this, Millett LJ drew 
an explicit analogy with constructive trusts, which in English law at 
least are regarded as “institutional” responses, which arise as the legally 
significant facts occur.32 The same vision is endorsed in subsequent Court 
of Appeal decisions: Halifax v Omar33 (“Omar”), Eagle Star Insurance Co 
Ltd v Karasiewicz34 (“Karasiewicz”), and Day v Tiuta International Ltd 35 
(“Tiuta”).
29. See e.g. Chetwynd, supra note 2 at 358-59; Thurstan v Nottingham 
Permanent Benefit Building Society, [1902] 1 Ch 1 (CA (Eng)) at 14 
(affirmed [1903] AC 6 (HL)(explicit dating back) [Thurstan]; Butler, 
supra note 2 at 283-84; Chandiram, supra note 2 at 747 (explicit dating 
back); Congresbury Motors Ltd v Anglo-Belge Finance Co Ltd, [1970] 
Ch 294 (Eng) at 321 (affirmed Congresbury CA, supra note 28 (explicit 
dating back)); Coptic Ltd v Bailey, [1972] Ch 446 (Eng) [Bailey]; Banque 
Financière, supra note 1 at 237 (explicit dating back); UCB Group Ltd v 
Hedworth (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 1717 at para 150 [Hedworth].
30. Boscawen, supra note 3.
31. Ibid at 335, 342.
32. Ibid at 335.
33. Omar, supra note 26 at paras 79-84.
34. [2002] EWCA Civ 940 at para 19 [Karasiewicz].
35. Tiuta, supra note 4 at para 42. 
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B. Priority Disputes
Secondly, when C claims that he is subrogated to another’s security 
interest, questions may arise as to the effect of subsequent transactions, 
under which third parties acquire interests in the same asset, by transfer 
or grant from D, the discharged debtor. Imagine that C discharged X’s 
security interest over D’s property, in circumstances that justified C’s 
being subrogated to X’s rights, and that D subsequently sold, leased or 
charged his property to a third party, Y. Is this third party, Y, affected by 
C’s subrogation “remedy”? Recent cases indicate that Y may be affected, 
apparently on the assumption that C acquired an entitlement in rem as the 
legally significant facts occurred, which can prevail against subsequently-
interested parties, like Y, in accordance with the rules that generally 
govern the priority of competing interests of the relevant quality affecting 
the same subject-matter.36 Within English law’s system of registered land 
titles, this includes, inter alia, the possibility of preserving the priority of 
C’s entitlement vis-à-vis later transactions by entering a notice against the 
affected register of title.37
C. The Validity of Supervening Enforcement Action
Thirdly, in Tiuta,38 the Court of Appeal appeared to assume that a 
court might determine the legal effect of supervening conduct of C, 
which occurred before he brought proceedings asserting a subrogation 
entitlement, and even in ignorance that he had any subrogation 
entitlement, on the basis that, at the time C acted, C was entitled to exercise 
36. Cf. especially Chandiram, supra note 2; Boscawen, supra note 3; Omar, 
supra note 26; Cheltenham & Gloucester v Appleyard, [2004] EWCA Civ 
291 at para 44 [Appleyard]; Bank of Scotland v Joseph, [2014] EWCA Civ 
28 [Joseph]. Cf. Anfield (UK) Ltd v Bank of Scotland, [2010] EWHC 2374 
(Ch) [Anfield], criticised in Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, 
supra note 9 at 39.68-39.76.
37. Joseph, supra note 36 (a notice entered against a registered title in respect 
of the claimant’s invalid charge was held to be effective to protect the 
priority of the subrogation entitlement that arose due to the charge’s 
invalidity).
38. Tiuta, supra note 4.
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rights that replicated the rights of the paid-off creditor.
Tiuta International Ltd (“TIL”) had loaned money to Day, secured 
by a charge over Day’s property, which was used to pay off an existing 
charge held by Standard Chartered (“SC”). Day failed to repay TIL’s loan 
when it became due for repayment, and TIL appointed receivers under 
its charge, with a view to having the property sold and recovering its 
debt. Day opposed this enforcement action arguing, inter alia, that he 
could avoid TIL’s charge ab initio for fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
that this would necessarily render the receivers’ appointment invalid. 
This was not, however, quite the end of the matter. The Court of Appeal 
held that even if TIL’s charge was voidable ab initio, TIL would from that 
time have been entitled to be subrogated to the SC charge, which also 
conferred powers to appoint receivers.39 Day answered that this should 
make no difference: the receivers were appointed under powers in TIL’s 
invalid charge, and not under the subrogation-based charge; as such, it 
was necessary to appoint the receivers again, expressly relying on powers 
conferred by the subrogation based charge:
a party purporting to exercise subrogated rights had to do so pursuant to the 
powers contained in the subrogated security; therefore it was not sufficient for 
TIL to have appointed the [r]eceivers by reference to the TIL Charge and then 
have sought to justify such appointment by reference to the SC Charge, or 
by reference to any new equitable charge created by reference to the equitable 
doctrine of subrogation; TIL needed to appoint the [r]eceivers again, but this 
time in express reliance on the SC Charge.40
The Court of Appeal disagreed: the receivers could be deemed to have been 
properly appointed. Lady Justice Gloster stated that it was “immaterial” 
that TIL “did not purport to rely on the SC Charge when appointing 
the [r]eceivers”, and that unaware of the potential defect, TIL had 
“purported to rely only on the TIL Charge to make the appointment”.41 
Subrogation, “in conferring a new equitable proprietary right on TIL” 
that “replicates the [paid-off] creditor’s old interest”, “operated to 
entitle TIL to the notional benefit of the SC Charge for the purposes 
of securing repayment of the TIL Loan made under the terms of the 
39. Ibid at paras 37-40.
40. Ibid at para 41.
41. Ibid at para 44.
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TIL Loan Facility”.42 The SC charge had included an express right to 
appoint receivers at any time after the lender had demanded any of the 
secured liabilities, or breach by the chargor of the charge provisions, or 
an event of default. Some event of this nature had certainly occurred 
in relation to the TIL loan. And according to Gloster LJ, the equitable 
doctrine of subrogation was “clearly flexible enough”, where the secured 
creditor is not aware that there is any challenge to his security, “to deem 
an appointment purportedly pursuant to a voidable security as one having 
been made pursuant to subrogation rights”.43 This decision presents some 
difficulties, but it undoubtedly provides further support for the existence 
of some pre-court entitlement.
D. Assignability
Fourthly, it has been assumed that a subrogation claimant may have a 
pre-existing entitlement that is transmissible by assignment;44 and cases 
can be found where a party has brought proceedings in the capacity of 
assignee without any exception being taken.45
E. Sub-Subrogation
Fifthly, there are cases involving so-called “sub-subrogation”, where 
C is held to be entitled to be subrogated to an intermediate creditor’s 
entitlement to be subrogated to an earlier creditor’s rights.46 This needs 
more explanation. 
One of the most common contextual applications of Banque Financière 
subrogation involves defective financing/re-financing transactions. 
Typically, C advances money to D, in order to discharge D’s existing 
secured liabilities to X, on the basis that C will be granted some new 
42. Ibid at paras 43-44.
43. Ibid at para 47 [emphasis added].
44. Omar, supra note 26 at para 61 (counsel’s concession).
45. Lehman, supra note 28 (a lender and the loan’s subsequent assignee 
brought proceedings claiming inter alia that, if the original charge was 
void, they were entitled to be subrogated to two earlier charges which 
were discharged using the monies advanced by the original lender).
46. See Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 at 9.16-9.37.
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effective security for its loan over D’s assets. If C’s expectation of security is 
not realised, C is commonly subrogated to X’s security interest, which its 
advance discharged. However, what if, exceptionally, X’s security interest 
also turns out to have been defective? Any entitlement to be subrogated 
to that security will be of limited value: any subrogation-based security, 
mirroring X’s security, will suffer from the same frailty. Nevertheless, in 
such circumstances, it is conceivable that X, who previously advanced 
money to fund a property purchase by D, or to refinance D’s existing 
liabilities, would have been entitled to be subrogated to the valid security 
held by an earlier creditor, who was paid off via X’s loan. Where that is 
so, the courts have been willing to say that C may be “(sub)-subrogated” 
to X’s subrogation entitlement: i.e. C is subrogated to the subrogation 
entitlement that X held, which was discharged when D’s outstanding 
liabilities to X were cleared via C’s payment.47
Consider UCB Group Ltd v Hedworth (No 2).48 Barclays Bank loaned 
monies to fund the joint purchase of a farm by Mr. and Mrs. Hedworth, 
expecting a valid first legal charge over the property as security for its 
advance. Subsequently, UCB lent monies which were used to discharge 
the Barclays charge, also expecting a valid first legal charge as security. On 
the assumption that each of the legal charges executed by Mr. and Mrs. 
Hedworth could be avoided by Mrs. Hedworth, because her consent was 
obtained by misrepresentations or undue influence of her husband, of 
which the lenders had notice, the Court of Appeal held (i) that Barclays 
had been entitled to be subrogated to the unpaid vendor’s lien, which 
its advance had discharged; and (ii) that when UCB’s advance was later 
used to repay Barclays’ advance, UCB in turn became entitled to be “sub-
subrogated” to the unpaid vendor’s lien.
Such “sub-subrogation” is difficult to explain unless one assumes 
that X had a pre-existing subrogation entitlement, which could have been 
discharged by C’s payment, so as to generate new rights for C, mirroring 
X’s extinguished rights, by a process of sub-subrogation (or, in the 
47. See especially Piddington, supra note 28 at 600-601; Hedworth, supra note 
29 at paras 134-48. See also Kingsway Finance Ltd v Wang Qingyi, [2013] 
HKCFI 1178 at paras 26-31; affirmed [2014] HKCA 578 at paras 35-37.
48. Hedworth, supra note 29.
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problematic language of pre-Banque Financière cases, which could have 
been “kept alive” for C’s benefit, when C paid X).
F. Loss of Existing Rights by Waiver, Abandonment or 
Merger
Sixthly, pre-Banque Financière cases commonly adopted a generous 
presumption that where C loaned money to discharge another’s secured 
liabilities, he must have intended to “keep alive” the earlier creditor’s 
security for his own benefit — a presumption that apparently yielded 
an immediate subrogation entitlement. Adopting this starting-point, the 
courts might then ask whether C had lost the subrogation entitlement 
that he had acquired in this way, by virtue of his having been granted 
some form of security by the borrower.49 Typically, the courts might 
inquire whether C had “waived” or “abandoned” his subrogation-based 
security, as a result of that transaction, or whether his subrogation-based 
security was “lost” by “merger” into some “higher-ranking” security that 
C had been granted. These cases would certainly be reasoned differently 
today, post-Banque Financière, in which the House of Lords explicitly 
preferred a restitutionary explanation for subrogation, to the earlier over-
reliance on fictitious presumptions of party intentions. Nevertheless, 
these decisions are interesting as further evidence of an assumption 
that there is nothing contrary to principle in C acquiring some form of 
immediate entitlement, as the relevant facts occur.
G. Interest Entitlements
Seventhly, the courts’ approach to interest awards in subrogation cases 
also evidences a pre-existing entitlement. Ordinarily, D’s debt to X, 
which C discharged, will have carried a contractual right to interest for 
X. Modern English cases consistently assume that where C is subrogated 
to X’s rights as secured creditor, C is prima facie subrogated to X’s security 
interest, and with it, both the principal debt discharged, and X’s previous 
49. See e.g. Chandiram, supra note 2 at 745; Congresbury CA, supra note 28 at 
94; Bailey, supra note 29 at 454; Burston Finance, supra note 28 at 1652-
58; Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd, [1978] AC 95 (HL) [Orakpo]. Cf. 
also post-Banque Financière: Appleyard, supra note 36.
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contractual right to interest. On that assumption, the “subrogation debt” 
which C can recover via its subrogation rights typically encompasses the 
amount of the debt that C was immediately responsible for discharging, 
plus interest on that sum, at X’s contractual rate, running from the time of 
discharge of X’s debt.50
H. Compatibility with the Juristic Basis of Banque 
Financière Subrogation
Finally, Banque Financière’s new rationalisation for subrogation — as a 
“restitutionary remedy” afforded to reverse “unjust enrichment” — can 
also justify C’s being afforded an immediate, pre-court entitlement. This 
is important. Earlier cases were not reasoned using the principles of 
the modern law of unjust enrichment, and the explanations explicitly 
adopted — which might rationalise subrogation as a contractually-derived 
entitlement,51 or as afforded by the law to effectuate actual/attributed 
party intentions52 — might have different logical implications from the 
Banque Financière rationalisation. Nevertheless, an unjust enrichment 
framework is equally capable of justifying a pre-court entitlement.
First, it is orthodox that as soon as the components of a cause of 
action in unjust enrichment are present (e.g. from the moment D receives 
a mistaken payment from C, in the absence of any justifying ground), 
C has a cause of action against D which, if proceedings are brought, 
ordinarily results in an award of monetary restitution: i.e. a court order 
requiring D to pay C the money value of the enrichment he has received. 
It is currently controversial whether D comes under an immediate duty 
to make restitution to C, who acquires an immediate, correlative claim-
right to restitution; or alternatively, whether D merely becomes liable to 
50. See e.g. Piddington, supra note 28 at 602; Filby v Mortgage Express (No 2) 
Ltd, [2004] EWCA Civ 759 at paras 63-67 [Filby]; Kali Ltd v Chawla, 
[2007] EWHC 2357 (Ch) at para 31 [Kali] and following. See further 
infra at note 159 below. 
51. Cf., e.g. the contractual flavour of the reasoning in Orakpo, supra note 49, 
per Lord Diplock.
52. Cf., e.g. the reasoning in the influential decision of Chandiram, supra note 
2, per Lord Jenkins.
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be ordered by a court to make restitution to C.53 Either way, D’s duty or 
liability arises out of court, “as the facts happen”.
Secondly, the Banque Financière subrogation remedy’s function 
seems to require C’s subrogation entitlement to be dated from the time 
when D’s liabilities were unjustly released at C’s expense. If the remedy 
is a specific restitutionary mechanism, which reverses in specie the unjust 
enrichment that would otherwise flow from the release of D’s liabilities, 
then dating C’s subrogation entitlement from the time of the unjust release 
looks natural: it is the most closely-tailored way of achieving that specific 
reversal.
Thirdly, recent descriptions of subrogation as a restitutionary 
“remedy”54 do not necessarily contradict the idea that subrogation 
claimants have some pre-court entitlement. “Remedy” is a notoriously 
unstable term.55 It is certainly common in legal discourse to use “remedy” 
to denote orders that a court might make; and on that assumption, the 
courts, when labelling subrogation a “restitutionary remedy”, might 
be describing relief dependent on court intervention. Nevertheless, that 
cannot be decisive. A court, when granting the relevant subrogation 
“remedy”, could be effectuating a pre-existing entitlement held by C, the 
subrogation claimant. In any case, there is a broader sense of “remedy” 
— a cure for an ill, or a legal response to a legally recognised mischief 
(e.g. a wrong or an unjust enrichment) — which is apt to describe legal 
institutions like English law’s “institutional” constructive trust, which 
operate by affording substantive rights to a claimant, independently of 
any court order, as the legally significant facts occur. This broader usage 
can easily accommodate descriptions of subrogation as a “restitutionary 
remedy”, even if it works in the most strongly “institutional” way — via 
53. The leading proponent of the “liability” view is Stephen A Smith; a key 
recent contribution is Stephen A Smith, “A Duty to Make Restitution” 
(2013) 26:1 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 157.
54. See e.g. Filby, supra note 50 at paras 1, 52, 55, 60, 62; Appleyard, supra 
note 36 at para 32; Banque Financière, supra note 1 at 228, 231-32, 236-
37; Boscawen, supra note 3 at 335.
55. On the meaning(s) of the term “remedy”, see in particular, Rafal 
Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
chs 2-4.
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equity affording a subrogation claimant immediate rights, independently 
of any court order, that are equitable replicas of the paid-off creditor’s 
extinguished rights.
Finally, a pre-court entitlement is supportable even if the “liability” 
model of the law of unjust enrichment is preferred — that is, even if 
D, against whom a cause of action in unjust enrichment has arisen, 
merely incurs a “liability” to be ordered by a court to make restitution, 
in proceedings brought by C.56 Translated to subrogation cases, an 
equivalent analysis would be that subrogation-justifying facts do not 
result in C immediately acquiring rights that are equitable replicas of the 
paid-off creditor’s extinguished rights. Instead, subrogation-triggering 
facts would immediately yield only a liability on D and relevant others to 
be subjected, via court order, to legal relations mirroring those that were 
extinguished (and a concomitant entitlement in C to bring proceedings 
to obtain such relief ). This important possibility is examined further in 
Part IV, below. 
IV. The Nature of Any Pre-Court Entitlement
If C has some form of pre-court entitlement in a subrogation case, 
two key questions remain to be answered: (i) what is the nature of this 
entitlement?; and (ii) what is the court’s role in effectuating it? Although 
interconnected, these questions will be tackled separately, in turn, in the 
following two Parts. On closer examination, some features of C’s pre-
court entitlement seem undisputed, whilst others are more open to doubt. 
It will be argued that the uncertainty reflects an as-yet-unrecognised and 
unresolved tension in the authorities between two different conceptions 
of the operation of the Banque Financière subrogation “remedy” — a 
“strong institutional model” and a weaker institutional model, which can 
be termed the “liability model”.
56. Smith, supra note 53. 
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A. The Essential Characteristics of the Pre-Court 
Entitlement
1. An equitable entitlement?
In its earliest manifestations, Banque Financière subrogation was the 
product of intervention by courts of equity. This heritage remains evident 
in the modern law. Leading modern cases expressly classify this species of 
subrogation as an “equitable remedy”,57 and it is common to find it referred 
to as the “remedy”, “doctrine” or “principle” of “equitable subrogation”.58 
Consistently with this jurisdictional basis, there is a consensus that the 
pre-court entitlement is some species of equitable entitlement. In older 
cases, this might be conveyed by statements that the security interest of X, 
the paid-off creditor, was “kept alive” “in equity” for C’s benefit,59 or that 
C was in the position of, or equivalent to, an “equitable assignee” of X’s 
security interest.60 Post-Banque Financière, we know that such statements 
are metaphors, rather than literal truths. X’s rights are not actually “kept 
alive”, and C does not actually acquire X’s rights, or the benefit of X’s 
rights, by transfer or otherwise. In Lord Hoffmann’s words:
the phrase ‘keeping the charge alive’ needs to be handled with some care. It is 
not a literal truth but rather a metaphor or analogy: see Birks, An Introduction 
to the Law of Restitution, pp 93-97. In a case in which the whole of the secured 
57. See e.g. Menelaou SC, supra note 6 at para 49; Filby, supra note 50 at paras 
1, 52, 55, 60; Appleyard, supra note 36 at para 32; Banque Financière, 
supra note 1 at 228, 231-32, 236-37; Boscawen, supra note 3 at 335.
58. See e.g. Swynson Ltd v Lowick Rose LLP, [2015] EWCA Civ 629 at 
para 47; Tiuta, supra note 4 at paras 14, 23, 27, 50, 52, 81; Pickenham 
Romford Ltd v Deville, [2013] EWHC 2330 (Ch) at para 54 and 
following; Filby, supra note 50 at paras 19, 31, 44, 51-52, 55, 57, 62; 
Cressman v Coys of Kensington (Sales) Ltd, [2004] EWCA Civ 47 at para 
44; Appleyard, supra note 36 at para 30.
59. See e.g. Chetwynd, supra note 2 at 357; Butler, supra note 2 at 282; 
Chandiram, supra note 2 at 745; Western Trust, supra note 2.
60. See e.g. Burston Finance, supra note 28 at 1652; Western Trust, supra note 
2. In cases involving subrogation to an unsecured debt, the courts have 
also sometimes described the personal claim arising via subrogation as 
an “equitable liability”: e.g. Baroness Wenlock v The River Dee Company, 
(1887) 19 QBD 155 (CA (Eng)) at 166.
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debt is repaid, the charge is not kept alive at all. It is discharged and ceases to 
exist. … It is important to remember that … subrogation is not a right or a 
cause of action, but an equitable remedy against a party who would otherwise 
be unjustly enriched. It is a means by which the court regulates the legal 
relationships between a plaintiff and a defendant or defendants in order to 
prevent unjust enrichment. When judges say that the charge is “kept alive” 
for the benefit of the plaintiff, what they mean is that his legal relations with 
a defendant who would otherwise be unjustly enriched are regulated as if the 
benefit of the charge had been assigned to him. It does not by any means follow 
that the plaintiff must for all purposes be treated as an actual assignee of the 
benefit of the charge and, in particular, that he would be so treated in relation 
to someone who would not be unjustly enriched.61
It has been suggested that the older cases, on which Lord Hoffmann 
based this analysis, proceeded via a “legal fiction”: equity regulated the 
parties’ relations “as though the [paid-off] creditor’s rights were not 
extinguished by the payment, [and] were transferred to the claimant so 
that he could enforce them for his own benefit”.62 However, in truth, 
this elaborate fiction is unnecessary. One can say simply that where this 
form of subrogation operates, equity operates on the facts to afford C 
new equitable rights, which prima facie replicate the rights that X previously 
held, and C extinguished.63 The English cases now tell us that this is a 
“restitutionary” mechanism, to reverse the unjust enrichment that would 
61. Banque Financière, supra note 1 at 236.
62. See Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 at 1.05, and see 
further ch 3.
63. See further ibid ch 8; and now Tiuta, supra note 4 at para 43, adopting 
passages from this text with approval.
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otherwise arise from their release.64
2. Potentially in rem?
Where C has discharged another’s unsecured debt, C obviously cannot 
acquire more than an in personam entitlement by subrogation.65 
However, where C has discharged another’s security interest, and there 
is no objection in principle to C acquiring the special advantages of a 
security interest by subrogation, the English courts have afforded C’s pre-
court entitlement an in rem status — reflecting his entitlement to be 
treated, in equity, as if he had the paid-off creditor’s security.
This looked in doubt immediately following Banque Financière.66 
Both the decision, and Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning, hinted that 
subrogation was an unnervingly flexible remedy in two connected senses: 
(i) even where a security interest was discharged, subrogation did not yield 
rights in rem — instead, the court operated in personam, regulating C’s 
relations with one or more other parties as if C had taken an assignment 
of the paid-off creditor’s rights; (ii) as a corollary, if a court had to decide 
whether a third party, who had subsequently acquired an interest in the 
relevant subject-matter, was subject to C’s subrogation claim, the answer 
was to be found by asking directly whether (if he were not so subject) the 
64. As Australian authorities seem to confirm, it is unnecessary to subscribe 
to the unjust enrichment theory to accept that “equitable subrogation” 
operates like this: e.g. Re Dalma No 1 Pty Ltd, [2013] NSWSC 1335 
(Austl) at paras 20-21 (“legal fiction” of revival); Saraceni v Mentha (No 
2), [2012] WASC (Austl) 336 at para 238 (“legal fiction” of revival)
(quoting Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4); Taleb v NAB 
Ltd, [2011] NSWSC 1562 (Austl)(“keeping a previous security alive is a 
figure of speech” at para 69); Saraceni v Mentha, [2011] WASC 94 (Austl) 
at paras 39-40 (quoting Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 
4); Cook v Italiano Family Fruit Co Pty Ltd, [2010] FCA 1355 (Austl) 
at para 106 (“legal fiction” of revival)(quoting Mitchell & Watterson, 
Subrogation, supra note 4).
65. For recent illustrations of subrogation to unsecured debts, see e.g. Filby, 
supra note 50 (unsecured HSBC joint loan account debt); and Niru 
Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading (No 2), [2004] EWCA Civ 
487 (unsecured judgment debt).
66. See Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 at 8.48-8.60. 
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third party would be unjustly enriched at C’s expense.
After early equivocation,67 the consensus today is that Banque 
Financière has not radically destabilised past cases. Thus: (i) where a 
security interest is discharged, Banque Financière subrogation does 
typically generate an entitlement in rem, as the facts happen, as a 
mechanism for reversing in specie the unjust release of an earlier security 
interest; and (ii) C’s ability to assert this entitlement vis-à-vis a later party 
is determined by reference to its quality as such — i.e. on the assumption 
that C has some form of pre-existing and potentially competing equitable 
entitlement in rem.
3. The nature of the equitable entitlement in rem
We come, finally, to the most difficult question: what exactly is the 
nature of C’s equitable entitlement in rem? The puzzle can be illustrated 
by reference to the “ordinary and typical”68 subrogation case, which 
arises from a defective lending transaction. If C lender is entitled to be 
subrogated to the security held by X, which was extinguished via C’s 
advance, what does C acquire, as the facts happen? Is C immediately 
afforded rights, before any court order, which are equitable replicas of X 
creditor’s extinguished rights, or does that put C’s position too strongly? 
If it is too strong, what exactly does C obtain as the facts happen? No 
sustained attention has yet been given to these questions, despite their 
theoretical and practical importance. The major contention of this article 
is that it will be hard to achieve satisfactory answers unless one recognises 
that there is a hitherto unrecognised and unresolved tension in the 
authorities between two different conceptions of the operation of the 
Banque Financière subrogation “remedy”.
B. Two Different Models of the Pre-Court Entitlement
English law is frequently said to adopt an “institutional” form of 
constructive trust, implying that such trusts are generated by operation 
67. See especially Omar, supra note 26, discussed further, below, Part IV.C.2.
68. The terminology used by Walton J in the much-cited decision in Burston 
Finance, supra note 28.
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of law, in accordance with legal rules, as the trust-justifying facts occur.69 
They do not arise only by virtue of any later court order. A fortiori, English 
law has not yet adopted any strong form of “remedial constructive trust”, 
which might allow courts, exercising a broad remedial discretion in 
proceedings before them, to impose a trust or lien over a defendant’s 
assets, retrospectively or prospectively from the date of the court’s order, 
as they think appropriate.70
It would be surprising if English law tolerated a dramatically different 
vision of the equitable entitlements generated in subrogation cases. The 
analysis in Part III confirms, beyond reasonable doubt, that it does 
not. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the Banque Financière 
subrogation remedy involves a species of pre-court entitlement, generated 
as the legally significant facts occur, independently of any court order. 
To that extent, where C is entitled to be subrogated to X’s extinguished 
security interest, the subrogation remedy, like English law’s constructive 
trust, appears to involve an “institutional” form of proprietary response. 
Caution is nevertheless needed. “Institutional” responses are 
not necessarily homogeneous. And on examination, two different 
“institutional” models may be discernable in the subrogation cases.
1. An orthodox vision: the “strong institutional model” 
The orthodox conception of subrogation seems to be a “strong” 
institutional conception: it assumes that C immediately acquires rights, 
independently of any court order, as the subrogation-justifying facts 
occur, which are an immediate equitable replica of the extinguished rights 
of X, the paid-off creditor. In effect, C is immediately placed in a position 
akin to an equitable assignee, albeit by operation of law, rather than by 
any voluntary disposition of X, the former right-holder. 
69. For this distinction, see Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
LBC, [1996] AC 669 (HL) at 714-16, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
[Westdeutsche].
70. See e.g. Westdeutsche, ibid; Polly Peck International (No 5), [1998] 3 All ER 
812 (CA (Civ)); Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance 
Ltd, [2011] EWCA Civ 347 at para 37; FHR European Ventures LLP v 
Mankarious, [2013] EWCA Civ 17 at para 76.
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If accepted, this model is likely to have important implications for 
the resolution of priority disputes where C is subrogated to a security 
interest: it assumes that C has an immediate equitable security interest, 
rather than a mere equity. However, it may also bring implications for 
the court’s role in subrogation cases.71 Arguably, there is no legal necessity 
for C to obtain any court order at all. C is obviously well-advised, to 
avoid subsequent challenge, to obtain a declaration confirming that the 
relevant rights have arisen; and C could certainly seek consequential 
orders, as necessary, with a view to enforcing the rights so declared — e.g. 
orders for possession or for the appointment of a receiver. Nevertheless, 
adopting this strong institutional model, any court order would have 
no role in creating or constituting the entitlements that C acquires “by 
subrogation”. They have already been delivered fully-fledged and fully-
formed, out of court, as the subrogation-justifying facts occurred.
2. An alternative vision: the “liability model” 
On closer examination, there are reasons of both authority and principle 
to question the veracity of this “orthodox” vision of subrogation, and to 
prefer a “weaker” institutional model. Adopting this alternative model, 
C does not immediately acquire rights which are equitable replicas of 
X creditor’s extinguished rights, as subrogation-justifying facts occur. 
Instead, those legally significant facts merely trigger a liability on D 
and relevant others to be subjected by subsequent court order to legal 
relations equivalent to those which previously existed, if this is needed to 
reverse their unjust enrichment (and a concomitant entitlement in C to 
bring proceedings to obtain such relief ). It is aptly labelled the “liability 
model”. 
The distinction between this liability model and the strong 
institutional model is not merely semantic. Important practical 
implications may follow. For example, adopting the liability model, 
where C is subrogated to X’s extinguished security interest, priority 
disputes should not be resolved on the simple premise that C has an 
immediate, vested equitable security interest ab initio. C has the benefit 
71. See for further exploration, Part V, below, “The Role of the Court”.
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of a liability to have a court subject D and relevant others to legal relations 
equivalent to those which previously existed. The law faces a genuine 
choice whether — for priority purposes — this “liability in rem” (and 
C’s concomitant entitlement) should rank as a full equitable interest, 
or have the lesser status of a “mere equity”, which is more vulnerable 
in priority disputes. Equally importantly, a court asked to adjudicate 
a subrogation case will have a real, non-trivial role, in effectuating C’s 
subrogation entitlement. At the very least, a court order will be a necessary 
step, in conclusively crystallising C’s pre-existing entitlement. However, 
one can also contemplate the court having some latitude, to deny/shape 
the remedy, on a principled basis.72
C. Choosing Between the Models: the Position as a 
Matter of Authority
Which model is the more “correct”? Looking to authority alone, the 
messages seem mixed. Much material from the subrogation cases is 
inconclusive. One Court of Appeal decision, Omar,73 seems to point 
decisively towards the strong institutional model, and thus requires 
extended discussion. However, on closer inspection, the case turns out to 
be an unsafe foundation from which to derive any general theory about 
the nature and operation of the Banque Financière “remedy”. 
1. The largely inconclusive state of the authorities
On a cursory examination, the support for the strong institutional model 
might seem uncontestable. Certainly, in key pre-Banque Financière cases, 
the parties and the courts commonly spoke in terms which implied that, 
within the traditional categories of subrogation, C would be regarded from 
the outset as equivalently placed to an equitable assignee of another’s security, 
and by extension, would immediately have a vested equitable security 
interest, effective in rem. Nevertheless, the best test of the veracity of 
such language is whether the legal characteristics which the courts have 
afforded to C’s entitlement in practice are only consistent with the strong 
72. Ibid.
73. Omar, supra note 26.
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institutional model. On closer examination, it seems that they are not. 
With little straining, the liability model can also accommodate the 
evidence, reviewed in Part III, that C has some pre-court entitlement. 
In particular:
• Common linguistic usage, which describes C as being 
“entitled to” be subrogated or “having become entitled to 
be” subrogated, or as having a “right to be subrogated”, 
is compatible with a vision of the law that involves C 
immediately acquiring the benefit of a liability of D and 
relevant others, to have a court subject them to legal relations 
equivalent to those that previously existed.
• A court’s “declaration” that C is entitled to security by 
subrogation at some earlier point in time74 can be interpreted 
as effectuating a pre-existing liability, dating from that time, 
to have the court recognise/impose legal relations equivalent 
to those that previously existed.
• The liability model can support the courts’ approach to 
priority disputes, which assumes that a subrogation claimant, 
who is entitled to be subrogated to a security interest, has 
a species of equitable entitlement, of a proprietary quality, 
which exists independently of any court order.75 One can 
conceive of subrogation-justifying facts triggering what 
amounts to a “liability in rem”, which has the quality of 
a proprietary entitlement — a liability to have a court 
recognise/impose legal relations in relation to an asset, 
equivalent to those that previously existed, which has the 
potential to affect third parties who later acquire competing 
claims to the same subject matter.
• The benefit of an uncrystallised “liability” of this sort might 
be assignable, just as one might assign an unliquidated claim 
in unjust enrichment, or an unliquidated liability to pay 
74. See on court declarations, Part III.A, above.
75. See on priority disputes, Part III.B, above.
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damages for a wrong, within the limits that public policy 
allows.76
• A liability model can accommodate the phenomenon of 
sub-subrogation, merely by adjusting one’s understanding 
of what is released/extinguished, when C pays X. It is not a 
pre-existing, fully-fledged security interest held by X, which 
replicates an earlier creditor’s security that X previously 
discharged. Instead, it is the benefit of an uncrystallised 
liability to have the court recognise/impose legal relations 
of that sort.77
• A court might decide to treat the parties’ legal positions, 
before proceedings are brought, as regulated in material 
respects as if C had the relevant rights from the time that the 
relevant liability accrued.78
• With little modification, cases exploring the possibility of 
waiver, abandonment, or merger of C’s subrogation-based 
charge are susceptible to a reading that what is “waived” 
or “abandoned” or lost by “merger” is the benefit of an 
uncrystallised liability to have the court recognise/impose 
legal relations equivalent to those that previously existed.79
In fact, the case for the liability model can be put more positively. In 
Banque Financière and ensuing cases, the availability of subrogation has 
sometimes been described in subtly different terms that, if anything, seem 
more consistent with the liability model. Three points require particular 
mention.
First, the courts commonly refer to this species of subrogation as a 
76. See on assignment, Part III.D, above.
77. See on sub-subrogation, Part III.E, above.
78. See on the validity of supervening enforcement action, Part III.C, above.
79. See on loss by waiver, abandonment or merger, Part III.F, above.
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“remedy”.80 This is potentially significant. In legal discourse, the term 
“remedy” often refers to orders that courts make in proceedings before 
them. Indeed, consistently with this, in some influential recent cases, 
judges have explicitly referred to subrogation as a “remedy” which is 
“granted” by the court.81 Such language points strongly towards the 
liability model, which assumes that the court has a necessary role, in 
crystallising subrogation entitlements by the orders that it makes. Rather 
more straining is needed to explain this language consistently with the 
premises of the strong institutional model. One would have to imagine 
that the term “remedy” is being used more broadly82 to describe a legal 
response to some legally recognised mischief, according to which the law 
alters the parties’ legal positions, out of court, where this is required by 
the principles of the law of unjust enrichment. 
Secondly, even more tellingly, in some of the same decisions, 
judges have drawn an explicit distinction between (i) the pre-existing 
entitlement that C has acquired independently of any court decision; 
and (ii) the “remedy” or “order” for subrogation that a court might later 
make. Again, whilst not completely unequivocal, this distinction is more 
suggestive of the liability model, according to which a court’s order has 
a necessary role in crystallising C’s pre-existing subrogation entitlement. 
Particularly important in this respect are Millett LJ’s words in the key 
pre-Banque Financière case of Boscawen.83 His Lordship seemed to draw 
a clear distinction between the pre-existing “equity” of subrogation and 
80. See e.g. Filby, supra note 50 at paras 1, 52, 55, 60; Appleyard, supra note 
36 at para 32; Banque Financière, supra note 1 at 228, 230, 231-32, 234, 
236-37; Boscawen, supra note 3 at 335.
81. See e.g. Boscawen, supra note 3 at 335, 342; Omar, supra note 26 at 81; 
Karasiewicz, supra note 34 at para 19; Tiuta, supra note 4 at para 42. 
Cf. Lord Hoffmann, in Banque Financière, supra note 1 (“subrogation is 
not a right or a cause of action but an equitable remedy against a party 
who would otherwise be unjustly enriched. It is a means by which the 
court regulates the legal relationships between a plaintiff and a defendant 
or defendants in order to prevent unjust enrichment” at 236 [emphasis 
added]).
82. Cf. Zakrzewski, supra note 55 ch 2.
83. Boscawen, supra note 3.
640 
 
Watterson, Modelling Subrogation as an “Equitable Remedy”
any subsequent court order for subrogation. To quote his words: 
[s]ubrogation … is a remedy, not a cause of action … It is available in a 
wide variety of different factual situations in which it is required in order to 
reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment. Equity lawyers speak of a right of 
subrogation, or of an equity of subrogation, but this merely reflects the fact that 
it is not a remedy which the court has a general discretion to impose whenever it 
thinks it just to do so. The equity arises from the conduct of the parties on well-
settled principles and in defined circumstances which make it unconscionable 
for the defendant to deny the proprietary interest claimed by the plaintiff. A 
constructive trust arises in the same way. Once the equity is established the court 
satisfies it by declaring that the property in question is subject to a charge by way of 
subrogation in the one case or a constructive trust in the other.84
And later:
[t]here is no justification for the proposition that [the claimant’s] right to be 
subrogated to the Halifax’s charge did not arise until [the claimant] elected to 
seek that remedy. Nor … is there any justification for the proposition that [the 
claimant’s] right to be subrogated … did not arise until the court made the necessary 
order … It arose at the very moment that the Halifax’s charge was discharged, 
in whole or in part, with [the claimant’s] money. It arose because, having regard 
to the circumstances in which the Halifax’s charge was discharged, it would 
have been unconscionable for [the debtor, Mr. Bajwa] to assert that it had 
been discharged for his benefit. At law, Mr. Bajwa became the owner of an 
unencumbered freehold interest in the property; but he never did, even for an 
instant, in equity.85
Drawing on Millett LJ’s words, in Omar,86 Lord Justice Jonathan Parker 
said that in the “ordinary and typical” case, where a claimant seeks to be 
“subrogated to security rights”, “the remedy of subrogation gives effect to 
a property right which already exists in equity, i.e. the right to be regarded 
as chargee of the property in question”.87 Likewise, in Karasiewicz,88 
building on Jonathan Parker LJ’s analysis, Lady Justice Arden said that 
the “effect of the … decision [in Omar] is that … the creditor who seeks 
to be subrogated is given the remedy by way of satisfaction of a pre-
existing equitable proprietary right which is vindicated by the order 
84. Ibid at 335 [emphasis added].
85. Ibid at 342 [emphasis added].
86. Omar, supra note 26.
87. Ibid at para 81.
88. Karasiewicz, supra note 34.
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for subrogation”.89 And most recently, in Tiuta, Gloster LJ again cited 
Jonathan Parker LJ’s analysis for the proposition that “the remedy of 
subrogation afforded by the court gives effect to a pre-existing equitable 
proprietary right (i.e. the right to be regarded as the chargee of the 
question)”.90 
Thirdly, unlike the strong institutional model, the liability model 
does not assume that C immediately acquires a fully-formed, fully-fledged 
bundle of rights that represent an equitable replica of the paid-off creditor’s 
discharged rights. As such, the liability model seems consistent with the 
juristic basis of this form of subrogation,91 and with the indications that 
the courts sometimes give, that the subrogation “remedy” has a degree 
of flexibility, and is susceptible to a degree of principled court shaping.92 
The exact nature of this flexibility is examined in Part V, “The Role of 
the Court”.93 On any view, C’s entitlement is not dramatically inchoate, 
to the same extent as an entitlement grounded in proprietary estoppel is 
sometimes — and perhaps wrongly — assumed to be. Nevertheless, its 
existence and extent may be in some respects uncertain, and therefore 
properly dependent on a necessary stage of court crystallisation — as the 
liability model assumes. This uncertainty is increased by the fact that later 
events can vitally affect the continued existence, extent and enforceability 
of any rights that C might appear to acquire via subrogation.94
89. Ibid at para 19. She went on to acknowledge, in the same paragraph, that 
there may be “factors which would lead the court to the conclusion that 
subrogation was not the appropriate relief ”.
90. Tiuta, supra note 4 at para 42.
91. See further, Part V.B, below.
92. Cf. Chetwynd, supra note 2; Boodle Hatfield, supra note 28; Western Trust, 
supra note 2; Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd v Muirhead, (1998) 76 P&CR 
418 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) [Muirhead]; Mortgage Corporation v Shaire, [2001] 
Ch 743 (Eng) at 756; Karasiewicz, supra note 34; Appleyard, supra note 
36; Filby, supra note 50; Kali, supra note 50; Anfield, supra note 36; 
Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus, [2013] EWCA Civ 1960 [Menelaou CA], and 
on further appeal Menelaou SC, supra note 6; Sandher v Pearson, [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1822 [Sandher].
93. See further, Part V.B.3, below.
94. For a clear demonstration of this, see Muirhead, supra note 92.
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2. A leading authority for the strong institutional model 
— Halifax v Omar
Pausing here, the liability model might appear to be a viable interpretation 
of the authorities on Banque Financière subrogation. There is, however, 
one key post-Banque Financière decision that seems to stand as clear 
authority for the opposing, strong institutional model: the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Omar.95 Omar is the only modern English authority to 
have directly considered the quality and status of a subrogation claimant’s 
pre-existing entitlement, and it reaches some emphatic conclusions. In 
short: (i) where C is entitled to be subrogated to a security interest, C has 
a fully-fledged equitable (security) interest, and not any lesser form of 
“mere equity”; (ii) the priority of C’s entitlement vis-à-vis later transferees/
incumbrancers falls to be determined on that assumption; (iii) this is 
because “[C] who is subrogated to a security right is treated in equity as 
if it had that security”,96 by which the Court of Appeal appears to have 
meant “treated from the outset as if ”. This important decision warrants 
extended analysis.
i. The decision in Halifax v Omar
The proceedings in Omar arose out of frauds practiced on Halifax by 
a “Mr. Khan”, with the assistance of a corrupt solicitor. Mr. Khan had 
obtained a £147,000 loan from Halifax, ostensibly to buy the registered 
long-leasehold of a flat for £210,000 from its proprietor, Ms. Garcia. 
The loan was to be secured by a first legal charge over Mr. Khan’s newly-
acquired registered title. In truth, the price paid to Ms. Garcia, via the 
loan monies, was only £132,000, and the transaction never proceeded 
as Halifax was led to expect. Two transfers of the leasehold title were 
apparently executed by Ms. Garcia — one in favour of Unitbase, a 
company controlled by Mr. Khan, and a second in favour of Mr. Khan, 
expressed to be at Unitbase’s direction. However, neither leasehold 
transfer was ever completed by registration, and no legal charge was ever 
executed in favour of Halifax to secure its advance. When it subsequently 
95. Omar, supra note 26.
96. Ibid at para 84.
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discovered the frauds, Halifax attempted to rescue itself by claiming 
that it was subrogated to the unpaid vendor’s lien, previously held 
by Ms. Garcia, which had been discharged via its £132,000 advance. 
Unfortunately, an obstacle emerged in the shape of Mr. Omar, then in 
possession of the flat, who claimed to have acquired a superior equitable 
interest in the property some months later, by virtue of (i) a contract 
to purchase the leasehold from Unitbase; or (ii) a 20-year equitable 
lease from Unitbase. As argued, the case presented itself as a priority 
dispute between Halifax’s entitlement to be subrogated to Ms. Garcia’s 
unpaid vendor’s lien, and Mr. Omar’s later, competing equitable interest, 
acquired via the transaction(s) with Unitbase.97 
The first instance judge found in favour of Halifax. Apparently 
on the assumption that Halifax had acquired an equitable interest, by 
subrogation, as the relevant facts occurred, the case was treated as a 
familiar priority dispute between competing equitable interests, which fell 
to be resolved in accordance with the familiar equitable principle that 
where the equities are equal, the first in time prevails. As Halifax’s interest 
pre-dated Mr. Omar’s, and there was no gross negligence or inequitable 
conduct to deprive Halifax of the priority that it would otherwise enjoy, 
Halifax prevailed.98
Mr. Omar appealed. His counsel’s arguments, insofar as they appear 
from Jonathan Parker LJ’s discussion, were ambitious. The starting 
assumption was clear: following Banque Financière, Halifax’s entitlement 
to be subrogated to Ms. Garcia’s unpaid vendor’s lien was a restitutionary 
remedy, awarded by the law of unjust enrichment. Less clear is what 
counsel sought to derive from this. On close inspection, Mr. Omar’s 
counsel seems to have presented three distinct lines of argument on his 
behalf. They can be restated as follows:99
97. Unitbase’s entitlement to the leasehold, of which Mr. Omar’s must 
have been derivative, was not closely analysed in the Court of Appeal’s 
reported decision; the argument probably proceeded on the assumption 
that Unitbase had acquired an equitable title to Ms. Garcia’s registered 
leasehold, by virtue of the unregistered transfer in its favour.
98. Omar, supra note 26 at para 25.
99. The arguments are extracted/re-constructed from ibid at paras 61-63, 84.
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• Argument 1: Halifax acquired an immediate equitable 
entitlement, in the nature of an entitlement in rem, which 
was nevertheless a lesser form of entitlement — a “mere 
equity”. Applying conventional priority principles, this left 
Halifax vulnerable: a bona fide purchaser of a competing 
legal or equitable interest (which is what Mr. Omar claimed 
to be), would not be subject to an earlier “mere equity”.
• Argument 2: Halifax acquired an immediate entitlement, 
in the nature of an entitlement in rem. It was an equitable 
interest, but having been generated by the law of unjust 
enrichment, it was more fragile. The developing law of unjust 
enrichment embodied a defence of “bona fide purchase”, 
and there was no reason why this developing defence should 
track historic technical distinctions adopted within property 
law. Any innocent purchaser, whether of a legal interest, or 
of an equitable interest (as Mr. Omar claimed to be), should 
take free of this form of entitlement.
• Argument 3: Halifax did not have an entitlement in rem. 
As suggested by a literal reading of Lord Hoffmann’s 
reasoning in Banque Financière, the question whether a later 
party would be bound to respect Halifax’s claim was not 
determined on the basis that Halifax had an immediate in 
rem entitlement, whose priority and enforceability should 
be determined by applying property law’s conventional 
priority rules. Instead, it was answered by directly inquiring 
whether, unless bound by Halifax’s claim, that later party 
would be unjustly enriched at Halifax’s expense. That would 
not be so, if the later party was an innocent purchaser of a 
competing interest in the same property.
These contentions raise obvious difficulties. Argument 3 depends upon a 
radical reading of Banque Financière,100 which sees the remedy operating 
100. See Part IV.A.2, above.
645(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
in a dramatically in personam fashion, inconsistently with widespread 
assumptions that subrogation can yield a real, fully-fledged security 
interest. Argument 2 meanwhile requires the unorthodox assumption 
that Halifax immediately acquired an equitable interest, which had a 
lesser in rem quality than a conventional equitable interest — and was 
the practical equivalent of a “mere equity” for priority purposes — merely 
because it was generated by the law of unjust enrichment. Argument 1 offers 
a more orthodox route to the same conclusion. If Halifax’s subrogation 
entitlement was a “mere equity”, then on conventional property law 
principles, it would attract priority rules that rendered it more fragile in 
the face of later competing interests.
The Court of Appeal did not hesitate in dismissing Mr. Omar’s 
claims. Unpacked, there were four essential steps in Jonathan Parker LJ’s 
reasoning.
• Step 1: Wary of the unsettling implications of the Banque 
Financière decision, Jonathan Parker LJ attempted to 
confine it within a narrow sphere. In his view, the unjust 
enrichment theory had no role in “ordinary” cases, where 
a claimant claimed to be entitled to a security interest 
by subrogation. Such cases should be resolved via well-
established principles, and not by reference to any novel 
unjust enrichment analysis. As such, the origin of Halifax’s 
entitlement, and its persistence vis-à-vis a third party like 
Mr. Omar, did not fall to be shaped by references to the law 
of unjust enrichment at all.101 
To quote Jonathan Parker LJ: 
[t]he key to the decision in the instant case lies in the distinction, emphasised 
by Lord Hoffmann in the BFC Case … between on the one hand subrogation 
to a security … and on the other hand subrogation merely to the indebtedness 
itself … The former category includes rights in rem; the latter is limited to rights 
in personam. The instant case falls within the former category; the BFC Case 
falls within the latter. … In the BFC Case, the House of Lords fashioned the 
restitutionary remedy of subrogation to meet a situation in which … property 
rights were not in issue. It did so by the application of the wider doctrine of 
101. Omar, supra note 26 at paras 70-83.
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unjust enrichment, so as to confer personal rights (as opposed to property 
rights) on a claimant who had been unjustly deprived as against a defendant 
who had been unjustly enriched. The instant case, on the other hand, does not 
require the remedy of subrogation to be fashioned in that special way. […] [It 
is] a straightforward case involving property rights, calling into play well-settled 
principles.102 
Jonathan Parker LJ went on to cite a handful of earlier authorities, 
including Justice Walton’s classic encapsulation of the “ordinary and 
typical example” of subrogation in Burston Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd,103 
whereby A, having paid off secured debts owed to B, was “entitled to be 
regarded in equity as having had an assignment to him of B’s rights as a 
secured creditor”. He then continued:
[t]he correctness of that statement of the law by Walton J is not in any way 
affected by the reasoning or the decision of the House of Lords in the BFC 
Case. As Walton J makes clear, he is addressing the “ordinary and typical” case 
where the claimant seeks to be subrogated to security rights … In such a case, 
the remedy of subrogation gives effect to a property right which already exists in 
equity, i.e. the right to be regarded as chargee of the property in question.104
Adopting these premises, Arguments 2 and 3 necessarily failed at the 
first hurdle. Each depended on the unjust enrichment theory, which ex 
hypothesi, was not in play.
• Step 2: A long line of authorities indicated that in “ordinary” 
cases, where a claimant claimed to be entitled to a security 
interest by subrogation, the claimant acquired an immediate 
equitable proprietary entitlement, independently of any 
court order, as the triggering-facts occurred.105 
• Step 3: The priority of this equitable proprietary entitlement 
should be resolved in accordance with the principles that 
ordinarily govern the priority of competing interests of the 
relevant quality, in the relevant subject-matter.
Stopping here, Argument 1 might still seem viable. A court might 
conclude, adopting a conventional property law perspective, that the 
102. Ibid at paras 70-71 [emphasis added].
103. Burston Finance, supra note 28 at 1652.
104. Omar, supra note 26 at paras 80-81 [emphasis added].
105. Ibid at paras 71, 80-81.
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pre-court entitlement of a subrogation claimant like Halifax was a “mere 
equity”. However, this point was apparently only weakly pressed by 
counsel,106 and it was dismissed very perfunctorily at the end of Jonathan 
Parker LJ’s judgment:
• Step 4: For priority purposes, the subrogation claimant’s 
equitable proprietary entitlement was a fully-fledged 
equitable interest, and not a “mere equity”. Any argument 
to the contrary was “bad”. The authorities cited made it 
“clear [that] a claimant who is subrogated to a security right 
is treated in equity as if it had that security”.107 
This last step was crucial. Jonathan Parker LJ’s explicit premise was that 
the entitlement that Halifax acquired from the time of the subrogation-
justifying facts was a full equitable interest, because it was an (equitable) 
replica of the paid-off creditor’s security. Halifax was “treated in equity as 
if it had that security”. In Omar, the paid-off creditor’s security was Ms. 
Garcia’s unpaid vendor’s lien. To the extent that Halifax’s money was 
used to pay the purchase price for the property, Halifax was therefore “an 
equitable chargee”.108 It further followed that Halifax had priority:
i. Halifax had an equitable interest which pre-dated Mr. Omar’s competing  
 equitable interest;
ii. applying conventional priority principles, Halifax’s interest had prima   
 facie priority, as the first equitable interest in time; and
iii. Halifax was not guilty of any “inequitable conduct” or “gross  negligence”  
 that could justify the postponement of its interest to the interest subsequently  
 acquired by Mr. Omar.
Presented in this way, the decision in Omar looks like clear authority for 
the strong institutional model of subrogation. A subrogation claimant 
like Halifax was assumed to acquire an immediate equitable entitlement 
in rem, amounting to an equitable replica of the paid-off creditor’s 
security interest, from the time of the subrogation-justifying facts.
106. Ibid at para 84 (observing that the argument, made in written skeletons, 
was “rightly” not developed in oral argument).
107. Ibid [emphasis added].
108. Ibid.
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ii. Doubts about the status of Halifax v Omar 
It is certainly possible to read early cases as Jonathan Parker LJ did.109 
Nevertheless, we should not leap too quickly to the conclusion that 
the strong institutional model has prevailed. There are several reasons, 
cumulatively weighty, for doubting the authoritative status of the Omar 
decision on this point.
First, the cases on which Jonathan Parker LJ relied pre-date the 
authoritative re-rationalisation of “equitable subrogation” in Banque 
Financière, as a restitutionary remedy to reverse unjust enrichment. 
The language of those earlier cases certainly pointed to a strongly 
“institutional” response, insofar as C was described as, or as equivalently 
placed to, an equitable “assignee”, or X’s rights were said to be “kept 
alive” for C’s benefit. However, this is a vision which cannot be sustained, 
without qualification, post-Banque Financière. 
Secondly, Jonathan Parker LJ’s conception of subrogation partly 
depended on the assumption that the Banque Financière rationalisation 
can be marginalised, and has no role in explaining subrogation to a 
security interest. However, the Banque Financière rationalisation cannot 
be dismissed so easily: their Lordships’ analysis does not bear the narrow 
reading that Jonathan Parker LJ proposed. Although the facts of Banque 
Financière were unusual, and the subrogation entitlement recognised 
by the House of Lords took an unusual, in personam form, the unjust 
enrichment framework was not thought to operate only in such unusual 
cases. It was being offered as a general rationalisation for the remedy 
afforded even in “ordinary and typical cases”, where the claimant had 
discharged another’s security interest, and was claiming to be entitled to 
109. See also later cases, which seem to accept the same understanding, obiter, 
without close scrutiny: Tiuta, supra note 4 (where the Omar case is 
relied on); Trustees Executors Ltd v Steve G Ltd, [2013] NZHC 16 (where 
Boscawen is cited as authority that an equitable charge arises “on the 
discharge of the secured creditor’s debt, independently of any court order” 
at paras 114-115).
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a security interest by subrogation.110
On close examination, the line that Jonathan Parker LJ drew between 
“subrogation to a security interest” (in relation to which he thought 
unjust enrichment had no role) and “subrogation to a mere debt” (which 
he thought was governed by the Banque Financière rationalisation) does 
not withstand examination, either conceptually or as an accurate reading 
of Banque Financière. It confuses the subject-matter of the subrogation 
claim with the nature of the rights generated by subrogation. 
In Banque Financière, BFC had advanced money for the purpose of 
paying off an earlier first charge held by RTB over Parc’s land, in the belief 
that it had effective security in the form of a postponement agreement 
with Parc’s group creditors, including OOL, a second charge-holder. In 
fact, the postponement agreement was not effective, and BFC sought 
to rescue itself, by alleging that it was entitled, by subrogation, to be 
placed in the same position as RTB — the first chargee — had previously 
occupied. To that extent, Banque Financière did involve subrogation “to 
a security interest”, and it seems that the court might have been justified 
in finding that BFC had an equitable entitlement in rem, mirroring 
the nature and priority of RTB’s security interest, but for one crucial 
circumstance. This was that to afford such an entitlement to BFC — as 
BFC originally claimed — would have left BFC unjustifiably better off 
than it had expected. It did not bargain for proprietary security over 
Parc’s land: it loaned money in the mistaken belief that it had an effective 
postponement agreement with BFC’s group creditors. That is why the 
House of Lords chose, exceptionally, to recognise BFC’s subrogation 
entitlement in an attenuated in personam form: i.e. BFC was treated as 
if it were an assignee of RTB’s first charge, but only vis-à-vis OOL, the 
second charge-holder, over whom BFC had expected priority by virtue of 
110. For recent acceptance of this at Supreme Court level, see Menelaou SC, 
supra note 6 (and in particular Lord Clarke, giving one of two majority 
opinions: “I would accept … that the analyses in Banque Financière have 
rationalised the older cases through the prism of unjust enrichment” at 
para 50). Cf. the lone sceptical voice of Lord Carnwath, in the same case, 
at para 108.
650 
 
Watterson, Modelling Subrogation as an “Equitable Remedy”
the postponement agreement.111
Immediately post-Omar, some judges appeared tempted to accept 
Jonathan Parker LJ’s awkward distinction.112 However, this view has not 
persisted. In numerous subsequent cases, the courts have directly invoked 
the Banque Financière unjust enrichment framework to justify the 
availability of subrogation even in what Jonathan Parker LJ described as 
the “ordinary and typical” case: i.e. where a claimant claims to be entitled 
to a security interest by subrogation.113 
Thirdly, contrary to Jonathan Parker LJ’s assumptions, pre-Banque 
Financière cases may not have authoritatively determined the exact nature 
of the subrogation claimant’s pre-court entitlement. They certainly 
indicated that it ordinarily had some form of in rem status. However, it is 
hard to find a pre-Banque Financière case in which a court had to decide 
the exact quality of C’s pre-court entitlement, in a competition with 
a third party who later acquired rights in relation to the same subject-
matter. Either the issue did not arise, or the result would not have been 
different, according to whether the interest was an “equitable interest” or 
a “mere equity”.114 If that is correct, then the proper characterisation of 
C’s pre-court entitlement was arguably a matter of first impression.
Fourthly, past cases, so far as they bear on this priority issue, are 
slightly more equivocal than Jonathan Parker LJ indicates. In particular, 
Boscawen,115 a case on which he placed much reliance, does not necessarily 
111. A reading of Banque Financière, supra note 1, recently expressly accepted 
by Lord Clarke in Menelaou SC, supra note 6 at para 50. 
112. See, in particular, Karasiewicz, supra note 34.
113. See e.g. Menelaou SC, supra note 6; Tiuta, supra note 4; Menelaou CA, 
supra note 93; Sandher, supra note 93; Lehman, supra note 28; Anfield, 
supra note 36; Primlake, supra note 28; Kali, supra note 50. And see 
Appleyard, supra note 36 at para 31 (where Neuberger LJ specifically 
dismisses as incorrect the assumption in the Omar and Karasiewicz cases 
that Banque Financière introduced any radical new principles into the law 
of subrogation). And see too Boscawen, supra note 3 (on which Jonathan 
Parker LJ placed heavy reliance, where Millett LJ expressly describes 
subrogation as a “remedy” for “unjust enrichment”).
114. Cf. Boscawen, supra note 3 (where a priority issue did not arise, for reasons 
given by Millett LJ at 331); see also Chandiram, supra note 2.
115. Boscawen, supra note 3.
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support the line he took. There are interesting passages of Millett LJ’s 
discussion where he considers Re Diplock,116 and the difficulties which 
the Court of Appeal had found in recognising that the next of kin might 
be subrogated to charges which the charities had paid off using monies 
improperly distributed by the deceased’s personal representatives. Lord 
Justice Millett noted the Court of Appeal’s evident concerns about the 
impact of such subrogation rights on third parties. Responding to the view 
that “insoluble problems” might arise in a case where in the meanwhile 
fresh charges had been created on the property”, Millett LJ said:
[it is not] clear to me why insoluble problems would arise in a case where there 
had been fresh charges created on the property in the meantime. The next of 
kin would obtain a charge by subrogation with the same priority as the charge 
which had been redeemed except that it would not enjoy the paramountacy 
of the legal estate. A subsequent incumbrancer who obtained a legal estate 
for value without notice of the interest of the next of kin would take free 
from it. It is not necessary to decide whether a subsequent incumbrancer who took 
an equitable charge only would take free from the interest of the next of kin; the 
question has not yet arisen for decision, but it is not insoluble.117
Lord Justice Millett’s equivocation in the last sentence concerning the 
resolution of a competition between any pre-existing subrogation 
entitlement and a later equitable charge is interesting. It is open to 
two interpretations. On one view, Millett LJ was recognising that in a 
competition between two equitable interests, the priority position is more 
complicated to state, because the “first in time” starting-point is qualified 
by exceptions that may favour the later interest. However, on another 
view, Millett LJ might have been registering uncertainty about the proper 
characterisation of the status of a claimant’s pre-court entitlement — 
more particularly, its classification as an “equitable interest”, or as a 
“mere equity”. The latter status would, of course, render it more fragile 
in a competition with later interests, legal or equitable.118 Although also 
inconclusive, the terms in which Millett LJ described the “remedy” of 
subrogation seem consistent with that analysis. On several occasions, he 
116. [1948] Ch 465 (CA (Eng)) at 549-50.
117. Boscawen, supra note 3 at 341 [emphasis added].
118. But cf. now the position under the Land Registration Act 2002 (UK), c 9 ss 
28-30, 116 [Land Registration Act 2002 (UK)]: see infra note 120.
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spoke of a “pre-existing equity” of subrogation, which arose independently 
of any court order, as the relevant facts occurred, and which a court order 
would subsequently “satisfy”.119
Fifthly, as previously noted, in Boscawen, Millett LJ appeared to draw a 
distinction between (i) the pre-existing entitlement which the subrogation 
claimant acquired as the facts happen; and (ii) any order that a court 
would later make, to “satisfy” the “equity”. This seems important. The 
strong institutional model, which Jonathan Parker LJ appears to endorse, 
suggests that a court has no necessary role in the process of crystallising 
a claimant’s subrogation entitlement. The entitlement has already come 
into being, fully-formed and fully-fledged, just like the entitlement of 
an assignee pursuant to a voluntary assignment. However, Millett LJ’s 
analysis is susceptible to a different interpretation, more consistent with 
the liability model. Adopting this approach, the “pre-existing equity” to 
which Millett LJ referred is C’s entitlement to bring proceedings to enforce 
the “liability”, of D and relevant others, to have the court recognise/
impose legal relations equivalent to those that previously existed. In these 
later proceedings, the court has a real, non-trivial role in crystallising 
the claimant’s subrogation entitlement, by its “order” for subrogation. 
Furthermore, adopting this approach, it does not follow that because a 
court will declare that C occupies the position of the paid-off creditor, 
this necessarily means that, for the purposes of determining the priority 
of C’s entitlement vis-à-vis parties who had acquired competing interests 
through intermediate transactions, C’s position is to be determined on 
the assumption that C, at that earlier point in time, had a fully-fledged, 
fully-crystallised equitable entitlement mirroring the paid-off creditor’s 
previous entitlement. There is a choice for the law to make, regarding 
the proper status of the in rem entitlement constituted by the “liability in 
rem”. It could be afforded the quality of a full equitable interest, or just 
a mere equity, depending upon how robustly the courts wish to protect 
119. Boscawen, supra note 3 at 335 and 342.
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later parties from undiscovered burdens.120
Finally, although Jonathan Parker LJ resisted this rationalisation, once 
subrogation cases are viewed within the context of the wider law of unjust 
enrichment, as Banque Financière and later authorities require, then the 
case for the liability model looks more compelling. In contrast, the strong 
institutional model, if adopted, risks some unfortunate inconsistencies 
with the wider law. These points are explained in the following sections.
D. Choosing Between the Models: the Position in 
Principle
It seems to follow that the English courts are at a crossroads when it 
comes to understanding the nature of C’s pre-court entitlement in 
cases involving Banque Financière subrogation. This question cannot be 
conclusively answered as a matter of authority. There is therefore a choice 
for future courts, when it comes to determining how, in principle, the 
Banque Financière subrogation remedy truly works. 
This is not, of course, an easy question. Indeed, on deeper inquiry, 
another wrinkle threatens to complicate the picture. So far, the 
discussion has presented a binary choice between two models: the strong 
institutional model and the liability model. However, recent unjust 
enrichment scholarship raises a question whether this is a flawed vision, 
in ignoring a third, and on some accounts more satisfactory, analytical 
120. In fact, in relation to rights affecting registered titles to land, the Land 
Registration Act 2002 (UK), supra note 118, which came into force after 
Omar, supra note 26 was decided, now seems to render the distinction 
between full equitable interest and mere equity irrelevant for priority 
purposes. Thus, s 116 declares for the avoidance of doubt that “in relation 
to registered land”, a “mere equity” “has effect from the time the equity 
arises as an interest capable of binding successors in title”; whilst ss 28-30 
lay down the basic priority principles which would now apply, without 
distinction, to determine a priority dispute between a prior full equitable 
interest/mere equity and a later interest.
654 
 
Watterson, Modelling Subrogation as an “Equitable Remedy”
possibility: what tends to be called the “power model”.121 Happily, on 
closer consideration, this turns out to be a red herring. The power model 
is ultimately a version of the strong institutional model, and suffers from 
the same pitfalls. The liability model should be preferred to both.
1. A possible third way: the “power model” ?
The availability and nature of proprietary restitutionary responses is 
undoubtedly one of the most contested and difficult areas of the English 
law of unjust enrichment.122 On any view, the authorities have not 
developed in a coherent, systematic fashion. Opinions sharply divide 
about the best interpretation of the existing materials, and the best 
direction for the law’s future development. One aspect of this debate 
concerns the precise mechanism by which the law achieves proprietary/
specific restitution. 
Recent academic accounts have come to distinguish two key 
121. A potential source of confusion needs to be anticipated at the outset. 
Under the “liability model”, a subrogation claimant, C, might be said to 
hold a “power”, in so far as C can, by bringing successful proceedings 
against D, precipitate a court order that crystallises his subrogation 
entitlement and affects an alteration in the parties’ legal positions. It 
might then appear that the “liability model” is merely a “power model”, 
viewed from the opposite side. However, within this article’s area of 
concern, this is an unhelpful and misleading equation. The “power” 
assumed by the “power model” involves something narrower: i.e. a power 
held by C to bring about a change in the legal relations of C and D 
by virtue of his own act of will, and without the necessity for any court 
order. In short, whereas the “liability model” assumes that a court order 
is necessary for the crystallisation of C’s subrogation entitlement, the 
“power model” assumes that C can crystallise his subrogation entitlement, 
by the exercise of a power vested in him. Alternative terminology, which 
might more directly capture the essential distinction, would be “court-
crystallised”/“claimant-crystallised”. 
122. For a survey of some key controversies, see Mitchell, Mitchell & 
Watterson, Goff & Jones, supra note 9 ch 37.
655(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
conceptual possibilities.123 One approach assumes that the law 
immediately generates fully-fledged proprietary rights in favour of C: the 
“immediate rights” analysis. A second assumes that C does not initially 
acquire such rights, but instead has merely a power to bring those rights 
into being, on his validly exercising the power: the “power (in rem)” 
analysis. Imagine, for example, that D receives an asset from C as a result 
of some restitution-justifying mistake, and that the law is willing to 
reverse this defective transaction in specie. Might the law achieve this by 
immediately rendering D a trustee for C, or alternatively, by affording C 
a power, which brings about that consequence — crystallising D’s status 
as trustee for C, and C’s status as trust beneficiary — only contingently, 
upon the power’s exercise?
If the availability of the Banque Financière subrogation remedy falls to 
be justified by reference to the principles of the law of unjust enrichment, 
then there will certainly be cases where the remedy’s availability must 
at least sometimes, and to some extent, be “power-contingent”. That 
is, there will be cases where its availability will assume the exercise of a 
“power” by C: e.g. the rescission by C of a transaction, induced by D’s 
fraudulent misrepresentation, under which C paid the money that was 
used to discharge X creditor’s security for D’s debts.124 However, some 
recent scholarship is bolder than this. Prominent accounts have suggested 
that for reasons of principle and policy, the law’s proprietary restitutionary 
responses should more generally operate via a “power model” (what 
Birke Häcker thus calls a “generalised power model”), rather than by an 
“immediate rights” approach.125 Translated to the subrogation cases, this 
123. See e.g. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 22 at 182 and following; 
Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, supra note 9 at 37.25-
37.28; Birke Häcker, Consequences of Impaired Consent Transfers: A 
Structural Comparison of English and German Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013) at 125 and following [Häcker, Consequences]; Birke 
Häcker, “Proprietary Restitution After Impaired Consent Transfers: A 
Generalised Power Model” (2009) 68:2 Cambridge Law Journal 324 
[Häcker, “Proprietary Restitution”].
124. See Part IV.D.2, below.
125. See generally Häcker, “Proprietary Restitution”, supra note 123; see also 
Häcker, Consequences, supra note 123, at 125 and following.
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vision of the law might suggest that the Banque Financière subrogation 
remedy should generally operate via a similar “power model”. Accordingly, 
unlike the model so far presented as the strong institutional model, C 
would not automatically acquire a fully-formed, vested equitable replica 
of X paid-off creditor’s security as the subrogation-justifying facts occur. 
Instead, the crystallisation of those rights in favour of C would depend 
on C validly exercising a “power”, which he held ab initio, to bring those 
rights into being. 
This “power model” merits close consideration. However, ultimately, 
for reasons developed in the following sections, it does not call into the 
question the conclusions reached here that the liability model remains 
the better vision for the Banque Financière subrogation remedy.
2. The multiple sources of “power-contingency”
When it comes to evaluating the plausibility of the “power model”, it 
is vital to recognise that the legal materials are, in important respects, 
“noisy”. There are several reasons why C’s ability to claim a restitutionary 
remedy for unjust enrichment might be contingent on C’s exercising 
some form of de jure power, to alter his legal relations with D and/or 
others. Consider the following situation:
• Example. C is induced by D’s fraudulent misrepresentation 
to sell an asset to D. Thereafter, and before C becomes aware 
of the fraud, D sells the asset, and then uses the money 
proceeds to discharge a legal charge over his property held 
by X. 
There are at least three reasons why C’s ability to seek a remedy on 
these facts, founded on the law of unjust enrichment, might be “power-
contingent”.
• Power-contingency 1. C’s ability to seek any restitutionary 
remedy against D might be found to depend upon C 
choosing to rescind the sale transaction. D’s fraudulent 
misrepresentation is likely to render the sale voidable 
ab initio, at C’s election; however, until avoidance, the 
transaction is legally valid. On that assumption, it might 
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seem that, for the time being, the contract provides a basis/
ground that justifies D’s receipt and retention of the benefits 
obtained under it. Unless the contract can be and is avoided, 
through C’s election to rescind, no unjust enrichment claim 
can be brought to recover for any benefit accruing to D, by a 
money claim or otherwise, inconsistently with the contract. 
Following this argument through, if C’s ability to require 
D to make restitution in respect of the asset immediately 
received under the fraud-induced transaction is dependent 
upon C rescinding the transaction with D, then so a fortiori, 
is any entitlement that C might have to be subrogated to X’s 
charge, based on D’s subsequent application of what was 
received from C under that transaction.
• Power-contingency 2. A second and distinct form of power-
contingency may arise if C wishes to obtain a proprietary 
remedy against D, and D no longer retains the asset 
originally received. In such a case, C will probably find it 
necessary to rely on the law’s tracing rules for the purpose 
of establishing a claim to some different asset in D’s hands. 
In our example, if D had identifiably retained the proceeds 
of sale, then C might seek to trace from his original asset, 
into those proceeds, for the purposes of making some form 
of proprietary claim to the identifiable money fund. On the 
more complex facts of the example, C might wish to trace 
the proceeds of sale further into the hands of X, the paid-
off creditor, for the purpose of justifying C’s claim to be 
subrogated to X’s extinguished security interest.
English law is undoubtedly generous in affording rights to unauthorised 
substitutes in circumstances such as these. However, there is an unresolved 
controversy as to whether this occurs by the law affording a person in 
C’s position immediately vested rights to the unauthorised substitutes, 
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or only a more fragile “power in rem” to acquire such rights.126 In the 
example, C’s ability to bring any claim should depend on his decision 
to “rescind” the transaction with D. There should be no question of his 
acquiring any vested rights at least prior to that occurring. However, 
even assuming that such a decision is effectively made by C, adopting 
the “power” model of rights to unauthorised substitutes, C should not 
acquire any vested rights to the money proceeds prior to his exercising 
the assumed “power” to acquire them. The same analysis would seem to 
dictate that C should acquire no vested security interest by subrogation 
at least prior to his exercising his assumed power to obtain rights in 
respect of the substitute for those money proceeds: i.e. prior to his validly 
electing to claim a security interest by subrogation, based on the use of 
that money to pay off D’s debts to X. On that assumption, our ability to 
conceive of C being entitled to a security interest by subrogation in the 
example might appear at least doubly power-contingent. 
• Power-contingency 3. A third possible form of power-
contingency is that highlighted by the recent literature, 
already noted, which argues that proprietary/specific 
restitutionary responses should more generally work via a 
“power” model.127 According to this vision, the law does 
not/should not generally reverse unjust enrichments in 
specie by means of immediately vested rights; it only does 
so/should only do so contingently on the exercise by C, the 
unjust enrichment claimant, of a “power” to acquire such 
rights. Insofar as the Banque Financière subrogation remedy 
is a proprietary/specific restitutionary mechanism, this 
vision would suggest that, even without any other reason 
126. Cf., e.g. the competing visions offered by Lionel Smith, The Law of 
Tracing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 356-61; see also, e.g. 
Peter Birks, “Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences”, in Peter Birks, 
ed, Laundering and Tracing (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) at 
307-11; and more recently in Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 22 at 
198-99.
127. See, in particular, Birke Häcker’s illuminating contributions: Häcker, 
“Proprietary Restitution”, supra note 123.
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for power-contingency, C’s acquisition of a “vested” security 
interest by subrogation should similarly be contingent on 
C’s exercising a “power” to acquire such an interest.
3. Implications of power-contingency for the operation of 
the subrogation remedy
It is impossible within the confines of this article to explore the validity 
of the foregoing assumptions; however, neither is it necessary to. Even 
if it is accepted that the availability of an unjust enrichment claim, and 
therefore the Banque Financière subrogation remedy, is at least sometimes 
contingent on the exercise of a “power” by C, this insight does not compel 
us to adopt any particular model of the Banque Financière subrogation 
remedy, and certainly not what has been identified so far as the “power 
model”. Four points require particular emphasis.
First, whether, when, and why the exercise of a “power” by C 
may be a necessary preliminary to the availability/enforceability of an 
unjust enrichment claim are much bigger questions for the wider law of 
unjust enrichment.128 In principle, whatever answers are given to those 
questions within that wider body of law should apply to the Banque 
Financière subrogation remedy in the absence of very good reasons to 
the contrary; legal consistency/coherence requires this. It follows that if 
future courts are to afford the remedy in a manner that is faithful to its 
modern juristic basis — in the law of unjust enrichment — they must 
pay very close attention to what that body of law has to say regarding 
whether C’s entitlement is, in any sense, power-contingent. This will be 
increasingly important if the boundaries of the subrogation remedy are 
enlarged beyond their historic contextual applications, under the banner 
of the Banque Financière “generalisation”.
128. E.g. does C’s claim in a particular case require his avoidance of a valid 
transaction? Does the remedy which C seeks depend on his asserting 
rights consequent on a successful tracing exercise, and if so, do such rights 
depend for their crystallisation on the exercise of a “power” by C? Even 
more dramatically, do proprietary restitutionary mechanisms generally 
operate via a “power”, with C’s rights not crystallising at least until the 
power’s “exercise”?
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Secondly, the fact that C’s subrogation entitlement exhibits some 
degree of power-contingency does not compel the adoption of a distinct 
power model. On inquiry, two major questions of principle arise for 
resolution:
i. Can C, a subrogation claimant, acquire a fully-formed, vested equitable   
 replica of X’s rights out of court (Model 1 (= the strong institutional model)),  
 or does he only ever acquire the benefit of a liability, of D and  relevant   
 others, to have the court impose/recognise legal relations mirroring those that  
 previously existed? (Model 2 (= the liability model))?
ii. In what circumstances, if any, does the existence/enforceability of those vest- 
 ed rights (Model 1) or of that liability (Model 2) depend on the exercise of  
 some form of power by C?
To put the same point a different way, there is no logical contradiction 
between either of the two models presented earlier and some degree of 
power-contingency. C’s subrogation entitlement might depend, in at least 
some cases, and to some extent, on the exercise of a power. Nonetheless, 
that does not determine, as a matter of irrefutable logic, the nature of 
the entitlement that crystallises upon the exercise of the relevant power. In a 
subrogation case, exercise of the power might bring about the immediate 
crystallisation, out of court, of fully-formed, vested equitable replicas of 
X’s rights. Alternatively, it might merely trigger a liability to have a court 
impose/recognise such relations. In other words, there is no obstacle to 
the liability model operating, if necessary, in a manner that is conditioned 
on the exercise of one or more powers by C. Thus, for example, in our 
earlier example, it might at least depend on C’s having elected to rescind 
the fraud-induced transaction, under which the asset being indirectly 
traced into the eventual discharge of X’s security, was transferred to D.
Thirdly, when evaluating the merits of the power model, it is essential 
to understand its relationship to the other models. As so far described, 
the strong institutional model embodies an “immediate rights” analysis, 
rather than a “power” analysis. Even so, it would be wrong to view 
the power model as a truly distinct model, which stands diametrically 
opposed to the strong institutional model. On the contrary, the power 
model is really a version of the strong institutional model. Ex hypothesi, 
C is assumed to acquire fully-formed, vested rights independently of any 
court order — the hallmark of the strong institutional model. The only 
material difference lies in whether these rights arise automatically, as the 
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relevant facts occur (= the “immediate rights” version) or whether their 
crystallisation is made to depend on C exercising a “power” to bring them 
into being (= the “power-based” version). The liability model, by contrast, 
operates in a fundamentally different way. As the subrogation-justifying 
facts occur, C merely acquires the benefit of a liability to have a court 
order recognise/impose legal relations equivalent to those that previously 
existed. C’s rights do not arise automatically, but neither do they arise 
by virtue of C’s act of will alone: they only finally crystallise by virtue of 
the court order. C can of course precipitate their final crystallisation, by 
bringing a successful claim for a judicial order. However, that is quite 
different from the de jure power that is assumed by the “power model” 
whereby C can, by his unilateral act of will alone, bring the relevant 
rights into being.
Fourthly, it seems to follow that debates about the relative merits 
of immediate rights and power-based approaches to proprietary/specific 
restitution are, in an important respect, a beguiling distraction. There 
is a more immediately important question of principle when it comes 
to understanding the subrogation remedy. Simply put: should C ever 
acquire fully-formed, vested equitable replicas of the paid-off creditor’s 
rights without any court order, or should the final crystallisation of C’s 
rights depend upon a court determination? 
4. The desirability of/necessity for court-dependent 
crystallisation
Although the point is not easy, the better answer, in light of the function 
of Banque Financière subrogation as an unjust enrichment remedy, is that 
court crystallisation should be required. The corollary is that the remedy 
can only operate via the liability model. Wherever subrogation-justifying 
facts exist, they should only trigger a “liability” to have a court impose/
recognise legal relations equivalent to those that previously existed. Those 
legal relations only finally crystallise upon, and by virtue of, the court’s 
order; they do not crystallise automatically, or merely by virtue of the 
exercise of a “power” by C to bring them into being. There are three key 
points that need to be appreciated, to understand that conclusion.
First, whilst proponents of a “generalised power model” of proprietary/
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specific restitution offer several reasons for thinking that the power 
analysis is superior to the immediate rights analysis,129 these arguments 
are not obviously directed to explaining why C’s rights should crystallise 
out of court. They seem to proceed on the unexamined assumption that 
that can occur; the focus of attention is on challenging the assumption 
that C, the unjust enrichment claimant, should acquire vested rights 
automatically, rather than upon C exercising a “power” to acquire them. 
In other words, the debate is substantially cast as a narrow debate about 
which version of the strong institutional model is correct. 
Secondly, on deeper analysis, some of the strongest arguments that 
have been offered against the immediate rights analysis, and in favour 
of the power analysis, can be accommodated within a liability model. 
To give one of the more important illustrations, the power analysis has 
been supported on the basis that it better reconciles the interests of C, 
the unjust enrichment claimant, and innocent third parties who assert 
competing claims to the same subject-matter. The “power in rem” that 
C initially acquires is assumed to have a lesser in rem status, prior to its 
exercise, insofar as it is susceptible to being defeated by/postponed to 
later bona fide purchasers of any form of competing interest. However, 
the liability model is equally capable of achieving a similar reconciliation, 
if desired. As explained earlier, the priority treatment of the liability 
model is not preordained: there is a choice for the law/the courts to 
make, regarding whether C’s claim to relief/the corresponding “liability 
in rem” should have the status, for priority purposes, of a full equitable 
interest or the lesser status of a mere equity.
Thirdly, all of this elaborate discussion is, in any case, a distraction. 
There are good positive arguments for thinking that whenever a 
subrogation claim arises, all that C should be considered to acquire is 
the benefit of a “liability”. What is more, these arguments stand opposed 
to any version of a strong institutional model. They supply reasons for 
thinking that court crystallisation should be a necessary precondition for 
C’s rights, which cannot be overcome by making the vesting of C’s rights 
129. See, in particular, the arguments offered by Häcker, “Proprietary 
Restitution”, supra note 123. Cf. also the supportive noises of Mitchell, 
Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, supra note 9 at 37.25-27.28.
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depend on C exercising a “power” to acquire them (as the power model 
suggests). If they stand up, the liability model must be preferred. There 
are two key arguments:
iii. Above all, whilst the subrogation remedy is not in any real sense a discretion- 
 ary remedy, significant judicial judgement may well be required, in order  
 to determine its ultimate shape and implications. The liability model seems  
 to offer the most realistic depiction of the court’s role in this respect, but it  
 is also the model that is most respectful of the need of all sides for authorita- 
 tive resolution of their legal entitlements liabilities. Full substantiation of this  
 first argument is deferred to the last Part of this article. 
iv. Reinforcing this point, the liability model may also be the more coherent,  
 when situated within the wider law of unjust enrichment. It has recently  
 been argued that personal claims in unjust enrichment operate through what  
 amounts to a form of liability model.130 The premise is that where the facts  
 establishing a cause of action in unjust enrichment are made out, D does  
 not come under an immediate duty to make restitution to C, who acquires  
 an immediate, correlative claim-right to restitution. Rather, D merely   
 becomes liable to be ordered by a court to make restitution to C. Some key  
 arguments for this vision can also apply to explain why it would be wrong  
 to imagine C acquiring fully-crystallised rights in a subrogation case, without  
 court order.131 Indeed, it would seem incoherent if personal claims in unjust  
 enrichment operated via a liability model, whereas subrogation did not. 
To illustrate this last point, imagine a simple case in which C discharges 
an unsecured debt owed by D debtor to X creditor, in circumstances 
where the release of this debt amounts to an unjust enrichment accruing 
to D, at C’s expense. The liability model of personal claims in unjust 
enrichment holds that D does not immediately owe a duty to make 
restitution in money of the enrichment that he received: i.e. of the 
monetary value of the discharged liability. He is merely “liable” to be 
subjected to such a duty, by court order. On the same facts, C might in 
theory put his claim a different way, arguing that he should be subrogated 
130. See especially Smith, supra note 53 and its accompanying text. 
131. Some of Smith’s arguments will be controversial. Nevertheless, he does 
appear to be on firm ground in highlighting the difficulties for D and 
C in an unjust enrichment case, of understanding whether and to what 
extent D might owe any duty to make restitution to C: see ibid at 
173-76. The apparent focus of his concern is the “standard” remedy of 
monetary restitution. However, there is, if anything, even greater potential 
uncertainty in subrogation cases in relation to the availability, nature and 
extent of the “remedy”, as explained in Part V, below.
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to the unsecured debt which X owed to C.132 In light of the common 
foundation of this alternative claim in the law of unjust enrichment, 
it would seem anomalous if it yielded a structurally different response 
— i.e. if D came under an immediate, fully-crystallised duty to pay 
C, which replicated the duty previously owed by D to X, rather than 
merely incurring a liability to be subjected to such a duty by a later court 
order. What is true of the simple but unusual case of subrogation to 
unsecured personal rights must also be true of the complex but common 
case of subrogation to another’s security interest. It would be similarly 
anomalous if the subrogation “remedy” saw C acquire an immediate, 
fully-crystallised equitable replica of X’s more complex bundle of rights 
and powers.133 
V. The Role of the Court
It is implicit in Part IV’s analysis that the correct model of the Banque 
Financière subrogation remedy does not just affect the nature and 
quality of any pre-court entitlement which is held by C, a subrogation 
claimant; it also has a crucial bearing on the court’s role in the process 
of effectuating C’s claim. The strong institutional model sees courts in 
an essentially confirmatory or affirmatory role: confirming that the facts 
justify the conclusion that C already holds rights that replicate the paid-
off creditor’s, automatically or by virtue of his having validly exercised 
a “power” to crystallise them. In contrast, the liability model assumes 
that the court’s decision and resulting orders have a necessary crystallising 
function. The relevant facts trigger a liability to a court order, which is 
enforceable in proceedings brought by C. However, pending such court 
132. See e.g. in Filby, supra note 50 (unsecured overdraft debt). This is 
ordinarily a redundant argument, insofar as it gives C no advantages over 
a direct personal claim in unjust enrichment; but that is not always so. See 
further Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 at 8.32-8.38.
133. Although it is difficult to identify unequivocal explicit recognition of the 
point in the authorities, the nature of the subrogation remedy, understood 
as suggested in Part II, above, appears to be that C acquires prima facie 
equivalents of (i) the discharged personal rights to payment that X 
previously held against D; and (ii) the security interest that X held as 
security for the satisfaction of those discharged liabilities of D.
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order, C’s subrogation rights do not have a present and immediately 
enforceable existence. 
The task for this last Part is to substantiate the argument that the 
liability model offers the best interpretation of the court’s involvement. 
To anticipate the conclusions that follow, two key considerations strongly 
favour that vision. First, the liability model seems to offer the best 
reconciliation of: (i) the universal instinct that C acquires some form 
of “entitlement” to the subrogation remedy as the relevant justifying 
facts occur; and (ii) the undeniable fact that, whilst subrogation is not a 
“discretionary” remedy, outside of the simplest cases, it may not possible, 
without court determination, conclusively to determine whether and 
on what assumptions subrogation is permissible, the form and extent of 
the entitlement, and/or its wider implications. Second, reflecting this, 
the liability model also offers the more realistic account of the parties’ 
positions in the period before any court order is made. Unlike the strong 
institutional model, the liability model does not require any counter-
intuitive assumption that, even before any court’s determination, C’s 
rights already had a present, fully-formed existence. It allows instead for 
the more realistic, transparent recognition that the legal relations that are 
“crystallised” by the court’s order can be dated back to the circumstances 
that justify their recognition, with binding effect at least on those who are 
bound by the “liability” to the remedy. However, it also means that this 
legal consequence is not a matter of irrefutable logic. It remains a matter 
for principled judicial determination, as it should be, how far, and for 
what purposes, any backdating assumptions should be allowed to run.
A. Forms of Court Order in Subrogation Cases
An obvious place to begin any inquiry into a court’s involvement in 
subrogation cases might seem to be with the orders that courts typically 
make, in cases involving Banque Financière subrogation. Generally 
speaking, these take two key forms. Unfortunately, on closer inquiry, 
these orders are inconclusive: they are compatible with either vision of 
the subrogation remedy. Surer guidance must be found elsewhere.
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1. Declaratory orders
In practice, claimants invariably seek a “declaration” as to their subrogation 
entitlements. These declaratory orders134 are susceptible to more than one 
interpretation. 
Adopting a purely “confirmatory” (or “purely declaratory”) analysis, 
these declarations are not technically constitutive of C’s subrogation 
rights. Indeed, they are technically unnecessary. Ex hypothesi, C already 
has the rights thus declared, and can in theory take steps lawfully to 
enforce them without any declaration being made. The role of a 
declaratory order in this sense is to confirm, in a form that does not admit 
of later dispute, that C has the relevant rights. However, strictly speaking, 
the rights declared pre-date and exist independently of the court’s order. 
They do not derive from the court’s order, any more than they would in a 
case where a court was asked to — and did — pronounce upon the legal 
effect of an assignment.
This confirmatory interpretation is substantially the analysis required 
by the strong institutional model. In contrast, the liability model requires 
a different interpretation, which sees the court’s declaration as at least 
partly “constitutive” of C’s subrogation entitlement. There is a sense in 
which it is partly confirmatory: it is awarded on the basis that the facts 
have generated a liability on D and relevant others, to a court order 
being made in proceedings brought by C. However, the court’s order 
is also unavoidably constitutive. The court’s determination, given legal 
expression via the declaration, is necessary to finally crystallise, in favour 
of C, rights against D and relevant others that replicate the rights that X 
previously held.
Viewed in isolation, these declaratory orders seem equivocal. 
Nonetheless, the language of some prominent recent decisions, which 
talk in terms of a court “remedy of” or “order” for subrogation, which 
“satisfies” or “vindicates” or “enforces” a pre-existing equity, might be 
thought to imply that these orders are viewed as “constitutive” of C’s 
rights — i.e. as right-crystallising.135 Reference can also be made to Lord 
134. See the cases cited, supra note 29. 
135. See the cases cited, supra notes 83-90.
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Justice May’s words in Filby v Mortgage Express (No 2) Ltd: “[t]he essence 
of the remedy is that the court declares the claimant to have a right 
having characteristics and content identical to that enjoyed [by the paid-
off creditor]”.136 Such modes of expression seem far less apt to describe a 
court order which is merely affirming.
2. Consequential enforcement orders
Alongside declaratory orders, the courts also commonly make what 
might be called “enforcement orders”. These are the entirely conventional 
orders that can be sought from a court by holders of conventional security 
interests, depending upon the bundle of rights/powers conferred by an 
interest of that nature and the ordinary mode(s) of their enforcement 
— e.g. orders for possession, for the appointment of a receiver, or for 
sale. Where such orders are sought by subrogation claimants, the range 
of potential orders should, in principle, mirror those available in respect 
of the security interest to which C is subrogated; e.g. if C is found to 
be subrogated to an unpaid vendor’s lien, then the range of orders that 
a court may make are the more limited orders ordinarily available to a 
lien-holder.137 Nothing more needs to be said about these orders. They 
are inconclusive as between the two models of the Banque Financière 
subrogation remedy, and relatedly, the two models of declaratory order. 
They can be conceived of as enforcing the rights that are confirmed (on 
one model) or constituted or crystallised (on the other model) by the 
court’s declaration.
B. Determining the Existence and Extent of Any 
Subrogation Entitlement
Rather surer pointers to the “correct” role of the courts in subrogation 
cases can be found in two different forms. One, considered in the 
following section, concerns how the courts determine the implications of 
136. Filby, supra note 50 at para 63.
137. As indicated by Thurstan, supra note 29 (“[t]he defendant society, having 
only an equitable charge, was not entitled to take possession of the 
mortgaged property. The proper remedy of the society was to obtain a 
receiver” at 13, per Romer LJ). 
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C’s subrogation entitlement, particularly for events occurring before the 
court’s order is given. The other, examined here, concerns the basis on 
which the courts determine the existence and extent of C’s subrogation 
rights, which are then declared and enforced. This is a complex issue, on 
which many chapters could be written,138 but there are nevertheless several 
key points that can usefully be extracted. What they boil down to is that 
it may not be possible, without a court’s order, to determine conclusively 
whether and on what assumptions subrogation is permissible, and the 
nature and extent of a claimant’s entitlement — except in the most 
simple cases. The sheer number of issues on which a court decision may 
be required presents a real challenge for a strong institutional model. It 
points firmly, if not conclusively, towards the liability vision — with its 
vision of nascent entitlements finally crystallised only by a court order.
1. The court’s general approach to the remedy
An important preliminary point is that, whilst Banque Financière 
subrogation is commonly described as an “equitable remedy”, a court, 
when asked to determine C’s subrogation entitlement, is not exercising 
a strongly discretionary jurisdiction. The courts do not claim any broad 
or unbounded discretion to grant or deny C the “remedy”, or even to 
shape it, as the justice of the case requires.139 The Banque Financière 
138. See e.g. Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 chs 3-9. 
139. See, most emphatically, Filby, supra note 50 (“[w]ithin [the unjust 
enrichment framework] the remedy is discretionary in the sense that at 
each stage it is a matter of judgment whether on the facts the necessary 
elements are fulfilled”; however, “[i]f … they are fulfilled, there is no 
residual general discretion to withhold the remedy nor to modify it simply 
to avoid harsh reality”; the flexibility “[does] not extend, and should 
not extend, to an unrestrained palm tree discretion” at paras 62, 67, 
per May LJ); see also, e.g. Appleyard, supra note 36 (a “flexible remedy, 
which nonetheless must be applied in a principled fashion” at para 34, 
per Neuberger LJ); Boscawen, supra note 3 (“it is not a remedy which the 
court has a general discretion to impose whenever it thinks it just to do so. 
The equity arises from the conduct of the parties on well settled principles 
and in defined circumstances […]” at 335, per Millett LJ); and Banque 
Financière, supra note 1 at 237, per Lord Clyde.
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subrogation remedy, where recognised, follows from the reasoned 
application of established principles to the case at hand. It would also be 
wrong to read too much into broad suggestions sometimes encountered 
that subrogation is a “flexible” or “adaptable” remedy,140 which the court 
can “fashion”.141 On examination, the flexibility which is referred to is 
simply a reflection of the diverse contexts in which the remedy might be 
sought and the many factual nuances of individual cases, which mean 
that the application of those established principles will not necessarily 
yield a single, uniform outcome.
2. Identifying subrogation-justifying facts
Secondly, the Banque Financière decision has brought a step-change 
in the English courts’ approach to the identification of subrogation-
justifying facts. Pre-Banque Financière, the cases, so far as susceptible 
to any rational explanation, typically proceeded in a categories-focused 
manner, on the basis of principles narrowly formulated by reference to 
those categories, and subject to analogical extension.142 Post-Banque 
Financière, the picture looks rather different. In principle, a court, in 
rationalising subrogation, is engaged in an exercise of explaining, using 
the principles supplied by the wider law of unjust enrichment, why the 
discharge of X creditor’s rights would prima facie constitute an “unjust 
enrichment” of D and others, at C’s expense, so as potentially to require 
reversal via the subrogation “remedy”. Consistently with this, in Banque 
Financière, the House of Lords made explicit use of the familiar analytical 
framework of the law of unjust enrichment, with its core inquiries into 
whether the defendant was relevantly “enriched” “at the claimant’s 
expense”, whether there were circumstances rendering this an “unjust” 
140. See e.g. Filby, supra note 50 (“[t]he remedy is flexible and adaptable to 
produce a just result” at para 62); see also Appleyard, supra note 36 at para 
34.
141. Cf. Sandher, supra note 92 at para 15.
142. See e.g. the former principle, authoritatively represented by the decision in 
Chandiram, supra note 2 (“where a third party pays off a mortgage, he is 
presumed, unless the contrary appears, to intend that the mortgage shall 
be kept alive for his own benefit” at 745).
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enrichment, and whether there was any applicable defence/bar. Later 
cases have increasingly followed this lead.143 One necessary caveat is that 
this framework merely represents an abstract, organising framework, 
and not a set of concrete principles susceptible to immediate, direct 
application to the case at hand. Each component of the inquiry brings 
into play a substantial volume of detailed common law doctrine, which 
remains, in key respects, subject to ongoing judicial development and 
significant interpretative controversies.144
3. Identifying the nature and extent of C’s subrogation 
entitlement
Thirdly, whilst it would be wrong to regard the nature and extent of C’s 
subrogation entitlement, where prima facie justified, as radically inchoate 
or undetermined, it would also be wrong to assume the reverse: i.e. to 
assume that C simply occupies the position of, or at least equivalent to, an 
equitable assignee of the paid-off creditor’s security, in all circumstances 
and in every respect. The modern “remedy” operates by generating 
new equitable rights in favour of C, which prima facie replicate the 
characteristics and content of the former creditor’s rights.145 However, 
that is merely the prima facie position, justifiable only to the extent that 
this is an appropriate mode for reversing the “unjust release” of the legal 
relations that previously existed.
It is inherent in that underlying remedial objective that C cannot 
143. See most recently Menelaou SC, supra note 6. See previously Menelaou 
CA, supra note 92; Sandher, supra note 92; Lehman, supra note 28; 
Anfield, supra note 36; Primlake, supra note 28.
144. See most recently Menelaou SC, supra note 6, which primarily raised a 
question as to what must be shown to establish that another’s debt was 
discharged “at the claimant’s expense”, in a sense sufficient to justify the 
subrogation remedy.
145. See e.g. the very clear statements to this effect in Filby, supra note 50  
(“[t]he essence of the remedy is that the court declares the claimant to 
have a right having characteristics and content identical to that enjoyed 
[by the paid-off creditor]” at para 63, per May LJ); and more recently, 
Tiuta, supra note 4 at para 43, per Gloster LJ. See also Muirhead, supra 
note 92 at 426-28, per Evans LJ.
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obtain greater rights by this mechanism than those previously held by 
X, the paid-off creditor. However, by the same token, the principles that 
support the remedy’s availability may well also dictate that C should be 
afforded different — i.e. lesser — rights, in one or more respects, than 
X previously held; and sometimes, that he should have no rights by 
subrogation at all.146 This may be the result of the application of inter 
alia: (i) familiar “equitable” defences and bars;147 (ii) defences, bars and 
other limiting principles that are characteristically available to defeat or 
limit any cause of action in unjust enrichment;148 and (iii) additional 
considerations that reflect the peculiar proprietary nature of relief 
ordinarily sought, when C claims to be subrogated to an extinguished 
security interest.
To give some obvious examples, even when C was responsible for 
discharging X’s security interest, the cases show that there may be valid 
reasons why: (i) it would be inappropriate to afford C the advantages 
146. As recognised by Lord Hoffmann in Banque Financière, supra note 1 at 
236. See for a full account, Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 
4 ch 8, recently adopted with approval in Tiuta, supra note 4 at para 43, 
per Gloster LJ; see also Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, 
supra note 9 at 39.29-39.40.
147. As assumed in Appleyard, supra note 36 at para 44. These include: laches/
acquiescence (discussed in Appleyard); and “he who seeks equity must do 
equity” and “must come with clean hands” (recently examined in Tiuta, 
supra note 4).
148. These include: (i) change of position (recognised/assumed in Gertsch v 
Atsas, [1999] NSWSC 898 (Austl) [Gertsch]; and contemplated in e.g. 
Anfield, supra note 36 at para 31, and Boscawen, supra note 3 at 341); 
(ii) bona fide purchase (implicit in e.g. London Allied Holdings Ltd v Lee 
[2007] EWHC 2061); (iii) “receipt for good consideration” (allowed in 
e.g. National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu, [2001] NSWSC 32 (Austl), at 
paras 44-45, 51); (iv) the objection that the rights being claimed would be 
inconsistent with a valid contract to which C is a party with X, D or some 
other; (v) illegality/public policy (as argued for in e.g. Lehman, supra note 
28; Anfield, supra note 36); (vi) limitation/lapse of time. See generally, 
Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 ch 7.
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of any form of security interest, by subrogation;149 or (ii) it would be 
inappropriate to recognise in favour of C a security interest which has 
exactly the same priority status as X’s interest, inter alia, (a) because this 
would be unjustifiably inconsistent with the basis on which C has validly 
transacted with D, X or relevant others;150 (b) because a third party, who 
was subject to X’s interest, can establish a defence that counters any claim 
by C to equivalent priority for his security interest;151 (c) because this 
might unjustifiably prejudice the ability of X, the paid-off creditor, to 
obtain satisfaction for any outstanding liabilities of D;152 or (iii) where 
the enforceability of any subrogation-based rights needs to be postponed, 
in light of the basis on which C transacted with D, X or relevant others.153 
Whatever the nature of C’s subrogation entitlement, there is also 
— inevitably — an important quantification exercise that must be 
149. See e.g. cases where it would be inconsistent with the basis on which C 
validly contracted with D, and/or with some other party, to obtain a 
security interest by subrogation, as in Paul v Speirway Ltd, [1976] Ch 220 
(Eng); Banque Financière, supra note 1; Re Rusjon Ltd, [2007] EWHC 
2943 (Ch).
150. Cf., e.g. Investors Group Trust Co Ltd v Crispino, [2006] 147 ACWS (3d) 
1069 (Ont Sup Ct).
151. See e.g. where C has made a binding priority agreement with another 
creditor, over whom he might otherwise have priority via subrogation to 
X’s security, postponing his claims to those of that other creditor; or where 
a junior creditor might establish that he changed his position as a result 
of the discharge of X’s security, by lending further money or by failing to 
take enforcement action to realise his security (cf. Anfield, supra note 36 at 
para 31; and Armatage Motors Ltd v Royal Trust Corp of Canada (1997), 34 
OR (3d) 599 (CA)).
152. Cf. the variety of solutions offered by the courts to this problem: (i) 
denying C subrogation rights until X is fully paid; (ii) denying C 
immediately enforceable rights until X is fully paid; (iii) accepting that 
C might have an immediate subrogation entitlement, but that it ranks 
immediately after X’s subsisting security. For comprehensive discussion, 
see Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 at 9.50-9.101. 
153. See e.g. common cases where a surety agrees with a creditor not to assert 
subrogation rights vis-à-vis the principal debtor until the creditor’s claims 
have been fully paid.
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undertaken.154 Thus, in a routine case, where C paid off X’s security 
interest, and is found to be entitled to an equivalent security interest by 
subrogation, this security interest will secure a monetary liability now 
owed to C by D. This liability — the “subrogation debt” — must be 
ascertained and quantified, as a necessary precursor to any enforcement 
action being taken by C, relying on his subrogation rights. This 
quantification exercise may not be straightforward, even in what might 
appear to be “simple” cases.
The presumptive “principal” amount of the subrogation debt will 
certainly be the monetary liability that C discharged; however, there are a 
number of reasons why it may be less than this, in light of immediate or 
subsequent events.155 To give just two examples, where C’s subrogation 
claim relies on monies advanced by way of a loan to D, it is very likely 
to be necessary for C to give appropriate credit for any repayments of 
that loan received from D;156 and the proper measure of D’s liability 
may sometimes be appropriately reduced or extinguished to reflect some 
qualifying supervening change of position.
Adding yet another layer of complexity, the measure of the 
“subrogation debt” will also be fundamentally affected by the basis 
on which the courts determine any liability of D to pay interest. This 
remains a contested issue.157 Recent English cases have tended to proceed 
on the under-examined assumption that the rationale of the subrogation 
remedy dictates that interest should be calculated and awarded on 
a “parasitic” basis — i.e. C can claim interest at the rate that would 
otherwise have been chargeable by X, the paid-off creditor, on the debt 
154. For fuller discussion, see Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 
at 8.145-8.156.
155. Ibid.
156. Cf., e.g. Rogers v Resi-Statewide Ltd, (1991) 105 ALR 145 (FCA); 
Muirhead, supra note 92; Filby, supra note 50 at para 65.
157. See especially Mitchell & Watterson, Subrogation, supra note 4 at 9.102-
9.121, which pre-dates Sempra Metals Ltd v IRC, [2007] UKHL 34 (a 
landmark decision on the availability of compound interest).
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that C paid off.158 However, even this apparently simple starting-point 
presents complexities. To give some obvious illustrations: (i) as lending 
rates rarely remain static, it may be necessary to make some (increasingly 
unrealistic/hypothetical) assumptions about how the paid-off creditor’s 
applicable interest rate would have changed; (ii) to ascertain the sum on 
which interest is chargeable from time to time, it may be necessary to give 
appropriate credit for any relevant payments that C may have received 
from D (as is likely where C provided the relevant monies as a loan to 
D); and (iii) the courts have some latitude to find that a lower rate is 
appropriate, e.g. where C provided the relevant monies as a lender, at a 
lower rate. A very different approach to the interest issue, evident in other 
authorities, is even more indeterminate. This “independent” approach 
denies the inevitability of “parasitic” interest awards, and assumes instead 
that interest can be awarded to subrogation claimants on an appropriate 
compensatory/restitutionary basis, selected by the court.159
4. Implications
It should be evident from what has just been said that the identification 
of C’s subrogation entitlement is very far from straightforward. On any 
analysis, it is certainly not a straightforward question of C obtaining 
equivalents of X’s rights, as a matter of course, and in all respects. Once this 
is realised, the liability model emerges as the more obviously appropriate 
representation of the court’s role in effectuating subrogation rights. It is 
simply implausible to assume, as the strong institutional model requires, 
that C held the relevant rights, fully-formed and susceptible to immediate 
enforcement from the time of the subrogation-justifying facts, and that 
in any later proceedings, the court is just involved in a (technically 
158. See e.g. Western Trust, supra note 2; Piddington, supra note 28 at 602; 
Muirhead, supra note 92; Filby, supra note 50 at paras 63-67; Kali, supra 
note 50 at para 31 and following, 42; Primlake, supra note 28 at para 62.
159. For a recent case, where the choice of approaches was squarely confronted 
for the first time, see Titles Strata Management Pty Ltd v Nirta [2015] 
VSC 187 (Austl). For earlier decisions taking an “independent” approach 
without discussion, see Mitchell, Mitchell & Watterson, Goff & Jones, 
supra note 9 at 39.85. 
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unnecessary) exercise of confirming/affirming their existence. So much 
potentially stands to be clarified, and turn on a court’s judgement/
decision, that it seems more realistic to imagine that the court is engaged 
in a necessary exercise of “crystallising” C’s nascent entitlement — i.e. 
transforming, by its order, the “liability” to the remedy, into an enforceable 
set of rights. This also seems to be the more appropriate analysis from 
the point of view of ensuring legal certainty for all sides. The potential 
indeterminacy of the subrogation “remedy” brings an important degree 
of uncertainty for those affected by it; furthermore, in routine cases, 
the affected parties are not merely C and D, the discharged debtor. On 
appropriate facts, they will also include: X, the paid-off creditor, who 
might retain outstanding claims against D; pre-existing incumbrancers, 
who hold superior/subordinate interests in the same property which 
may be adversely affected by C’s claim; and other third parties who have 
subsequently acquired competing interests in the same subject matter. 
Due regard for their interests, including their need for clarity about the 
existence and extent of C’s entitlements, further reinforces the case for a 
necessary stage of court “crystallization”.160
C. Determining the Wider Implications of Any 
Subrogation Entitlement
There is one final point that must be made. Even once the existence and 
extent of C’s subrogation entitlement is ascertained, there is a further 
potential source of difficulty: i.e. working out the wider ramifications 
of C’s entitlement. This has many possible dimensions, which cannot 
exhaustively be surveyed here. A few examples must suffice.
In many subrogation cases, C will bring proceedings with a view to 
taking some form of enforcement action, relying on whatever are found 
to be his subrogation-based rights. A question then arises whether, in 
160. Cf., e.g. recently Kali, supra note 50: the primary driver for extended 
discussion of what sums could be charged under the claimant’s 
subrogation-based security interest, as interest and costs, was the concerns 
of an existing junior secured creditor, whose subordinate security interest 
would be more or less deficient depending on the exact sum secured by 
the claimant’s superior subrogation-based charge.
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light of the nature of those rights, the action is justified. That can raise 
some difficult questions of interpretation and attribution for a court for 
the purpose of determining (i) the basis on which enforcement action 
might be taken, pursuant to C’s subrogation rights; and (ii) whether an 
occasion for such action can be “deemed” to have accrued. This is amply 
illustrated by Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd v Muirhead 161 (“Muirhead”), 
where the Court of Appeal held that the judge had prematurely made 
an order for possession in favour of the claimant lender, based on its 
being subrogated to an earlier charge. No such order should have been 
made, without first ascertaining what sums, if any, could be deemed to 
be due under the subrogation-based charge, and potentially in default. 
This required, inter alia, a court determination to ascertain how far sums 
received by the claimant lender, in repayment of its loan, should be taken 
to reduce the subrogation debt. The answer, on inquiry, might be that 
there was no outstanding debt, with the result that any enforcement 
action, based on that charge, must fail.
The Muirhead case illustrates how important a court’s determination 
may be to the practical enforcement of C’s rights, even in what may be 
perfectly routine cases. Even more challenging questions may sometimes 
arise as to the significance of C’s subrogation entitlement for events that 
occurred before any court’s determination, and potentially at a time when 
the parties were unaware of any potential subrogation claim. It seems 
very likely that these will be susceptible to more appropriate, transparent 
resolution if the premises of the liability model are accepted. Consider 
two simple hypotheticals:
i. C lender takes enforcement action, out of court, by taking possession of D’s  
 property, pursuant to what it believes is a valid legal charge.162 There is   
 in fact no such charge, with the result that C’s conduct is prima facie   
 unlawful. However, at the time C lender took possession, and unknown  
 to all sides, C was potentially entitled to be subrogated to an earlier legal  
 charge, held by X, which the monies loaned by C had paid off, under which  
 X lender would have had the right to possession. In light of C’s potential  
 subrogation entitlement, has C acted wrongfully, in taking possession?
ii. C lender takes enforcement action, out of court, by appointing a  
161. Muirhead, supra note 92.
162. Cf. the facts of Thurstan, supra note 29. 
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receiver, who takes possession of D’s property, pursuant to what C believes is a 
valid charge.163 There is in fact no such charge, with the result that the receiver’s 
appointment is obviously challengeable. However, at the time C lender appointed 
the receiver, C was potentially entitled to be subrogated to an earlier charge, held 
by X, which C had paid off, under which X lender would have had the right, on 
certain conditions, to appoint a receiver. In light of C’s subrogation entitlement, 
should the receiver be deemed to have been invalidly appointed?
On what basis should these sorts of question be resolved? The strong 
institutional model suggests a bold answer: i.e. C acquired fully-formed, 
immediately enforceable replicas of the paid-off creditor’s rights as the 
subrogation-justifying acts occurred; and the legal implications of earlier 
events should be straightforwardly determined on that basis. However, 
on closer examination, that is unlikely to be a satisfactory way forward: it 
seems dangerously conclusive of rather difficult issues. The truer picture 
— that pending court clarification, the existence, nature and extent of 
C’s subrogation entitlement may well be indeterminate in important 
respects — suggests that the liability model promises a more appropriate, 
nuanced solution. Adopting that model: (i) the court’s order is a necessary 
stage in the crystallisation of C’s rights; (ii) as a consequence, those rights 
do not have a present, and immediately enforceable existence, in the 
period before the court order; (iii) the legal relations that are confirmed 
and crystallised by the court’s order might of course be dated back to 
the circumstances that justified their recognition, with binding effect 
at least for those who are “liable” to the remedy; (iv) nevertheless, the 
liability model allows us to see that this legal consequence does not 
follow as a matter of irrefutable logic; it remains a matter for principled 
judicial determination how far, and for what purposes, any backdating 
assumptions should be allowed to run.
VI. Conclusion
Banque Financière’s “new” rationalisation of subrogation to “extinguished 
rights”, as an “equitable remedy” designed to reverse “unjust 
enrichment”,164 forces us to take a fresh look at the nature and operation 
of this long-standing equitable phenomenon. On closer inquiry, several 
163. Cf. the facts of Tiuta, supra note 4.
164. See Part II, above.
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models compete for recognition, but one must ultimately prevail: the 
weaker institutional conception embodied in the liability model. This 
model respects the consistent assumption165 that a subrogation claimant, 
C, acquires some form of entitlement as the subrogation-justifying facts 
happen. At the same time, it rejects the dangerously bold premise of 
any stronger institutional conception, that C acquires fully-formed, 
enforceable equitable replicas of the paid-off creditor’s rights, prior to any 
court order being made. The better, alternative view166 is that as the facts 
happen, D (the discharged debtor) and relevant others (e.g. junior secured 
creditors) merely come under a liability to be subjected by subsequent 
court order to legal relations, equivalent to those that previously existed, 
if this is necessary to reverse the unjust enrichment that resulted from 
their release; whilst C acquires a concomitant entitlement to bring legal 
proceedings to obtain such relief. In a typical case where C is entitled to 
obtain a security interest by this process of subrogation, this equitable 
liability/C’s concomitant equitable entitlement certainly has an effect “in 
rem”. Nevertheless, the final crystallisation of that nascent entitlement 
into an enforceable, vested equitable replica of the paid-off creditor’s 
security interest, properly depends upon a court’s determination and 
order. 
165. See Part III, above.
166. See Parts IV and V, above.
